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voting down a merger with Mitel. It argues that Inter-Tel represents an attempt to limit Blasius's
compelling justification standard for board action interfering with the shareholder franchise to
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INTRODUCTION
Since Chancellor Allen's seminal opinion in Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas
Corp., it has been a bedrock principle of Delaware corporate law that when a
board acts for the "primary purpose of thwarting" the exercise of the
shareholder franchise' it is not entitled to the protection of the business
judgment rule,2 and instead must provide a compelling justification for its
action.' After declaring that "[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological
underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power rests, " '
Chancellor Allen explained why the deferential business judgment rule,
according to which courts presume that disinterested directors are informed as
to the subject of a business decision and have made a good faith determination
that the decision is in the best interests of the corporation,5 is inapplicable
when the board acts for the primary purpose of interfering with the
shareholder franchise. 6 According to the Chancellor, "a decision by the board
to act for the primary purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder
vote inevitably involves the question who, as between the principal and the
agent, has authority with respect to a matter of internal corporate
governance."' Such a decision, he continued, "does not involve the exercise of
the corporation's power over its property, or with respect to its rights or
1. 564 A.2d 651, 662 (Del. Ch. 1988).
2. The canonical Delaware case articulating the business judgment rule is Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 8o5 (Del. 1984), which was overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000).
3. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661.
4. Id. at 659.
s. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate
Governance in America, 52 Bus. LAw. 393, 403 (1997) ("Decisions of directors which can be
attributed to any rational business purpose will be respected if they are made by directors
who are independent and act with due care and in good faith.").
6. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659-60.
7. Id. There has been much debate about whether the board can be considered an agent of
shareholders in the conventional legal sense. Compare Unisuper Ltd. v. News Corp., No.
1699-N, 2005 WL 3529317, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2005) (describing the board as the agent
of shareholders), with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88
IowA L. REv. 1, 33 (2002) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Nexus] (arguing that directors are not
mere agents of the shareholders). The analysis of agency costs that appears throughout this
Note remains applicable even if one rejects the legal characterization of the board as an
agent, and even those who resist such a characterization recognize the general existence of a
principal-agent problem. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1735, 1746 (2006) ("[M]uch of corporate law is best




obligations; rather, it involves allocation, between shareholders as a class and
the board, of effective power with respect to governance of the corporation.,
8
The Chancellor concluded that a decision to alter this allocation of power, even
if made in good faith, cannot be left to the board's business judgment.9
Although the court in Blasius declined to adopt a rule of per se invalidity,"0
application of the Blasius standard of review has virtually always sounded the
death knell for the challenged action." In Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc.,
however, Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware Chancery Court upheld
against a Blasius challenge the Inter-Tel board's decision to postpone its
imminent special meeting in order to prevent shareholders from voting against
a merger that the company had negotiated with Mitel."2 The court first
suggested that when the board interferes with a shareholder vote touching on
matters of corporate control, its actions should not be evaluated under Blasius
but instead should be subject to the Unocal reasonableness test, which is
generally applicable to defensive action taken by the board in the context of a
contest for corporate control, and which requires the board first to identify a
legitimate corporate objective served by its action and then to show that it
acted reasonably in relation to that objective.13 According to the court, the
postponement in Inter-Tel survived Unocal scrutiny since it was a reasonable
means of achieving the legitimate objective of preserving the deal for
shareholders.
Because the Vice Chancellor recognized that the Delaware Supreme Court
has continued to apply Blasius review even in circumstances implicating
Unocal, he upheld the postponement under Blasius as well. Emphasizing that
the directors were independent and did not expect to have a role in the
surviving entity, the court held that the board had presented a compelling
justification under Blasius when it postponed the meeting in order to give
shareholders additional time to consider the merits of the transaction and to
prevent them from irretrievably losing a deal that the disinterested board in
good faith believed to be in the shareholders' best interests.'
4
8. Blasius, 56 4 A.2d at 660.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 662.
ii. See Michael B. Tumas & Michael K. Reilly, Rethinking the Blasius Standard of Review: The
Implications of Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., Potter Anderson & Corroon, Apr. 20o8,
at 1 n.3, http://www.potteranderson.com/assets/attachments/Rethinking.theBlasius
Standard-of Review.pdf.
12. 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007).
13. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
14. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 819.
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This Note analyzes the state of the Blasius doctrine after Inter-Tel. Part I
reviews the basic structure of the doctrine. It identifies two broad categories of
board action that have been found to trigger Blasius review: (1) acts designed to
thwart the ability of shareholders to replace the incumbent board, which I refer
to as entrenchment cases, and (2) acts designed to thwart a vote on a business
transaction that requires shareholder approval as a matter of law. The first
category goes to the heart of Blasius, but the second category has historically
been within its scope as well.
Part II examines Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion in Inter-Tel, a case that
falls into the second category. It argues that the opinion departs from
traditional Blasius analysis in two ways. First, it openly seeks to replace Blasius
with Unocal review in the context of a contest for corporate control. More
subtly, it attempts, at a minimum, to confine Blasius to entrenchment cases.
The combined effect of these two doctrinal changes would have been to
effectively eliminate Blasius as a separate doctrine. When the board interferes
with the shareholder franchise in a situation implicating control of the
corporation, Unocal would govern. Unocal would completely displace Blasius in
this context whether or not the board is allegedly motivated by a desire to
entrench itself, although the outcome of Unocal review would be heavily
influenced by the presence of such a motive.'" With respect to board action
interfering with a vote that involves an ordinary business proposal rather than
the composition of the board or control of the corporation, Unocal does not
apply and, moreover, board entrenchment will not be at issue; thus, Inter-Tel
suggests that the board's action would be evaluated under the business
judgment rule.' 6 However, Inter-Tel cannot be read to completely nullify
Blasius review because Vice Chancellor Strine expressly recognized that stare
decisis foreclosed the possibility of replacing Blasius with Unocal in the
corporate control context.17 Instead, the practical import of Inter-Tel is to
quietly but substantially alter the content of Blasius review in nonentrenchment
cases so that it bears little resemblance to the doctrine of strict scrutiny
announced by Chancellor Allen two decades ago.
Part III offers a normative analysis of the court's decision in Inter-Tel. It
argues that while the decision may seem reasonable ex post insofar as
shareholders would have voted down the Mitel merger on the basis of
potentially incomplete information but for the postponement, it is less
15. See id. at 811.
16. Id. at 811, 812 n.78 (expressing skepticism that adjournments of votes "not implicating
director tenure or corporate control" should be subject to either Blasius or Unocal review).




defensible when certain ex ante agency cost considerations are taken into
account. In particular, it suggests that a strong presumption against board
action designed to thwart an imminent shareholder vote is an optimal default
rule. Although such a rule imposes a monitoring cost on the firm by reducing
the discretion of the board to respond to contingencies, it also reduces residual
agency costs 8 to the extent that there is a heightened risk of abuse or error
when the board acts to disenfranchise shareholders in the context of a
fundamental business transaction, assuming that courts may not always be able
to detect such mismanagement.1 9 Even if it is uncertain whether on balance the
reduction in residual agency costs outweighs the increase in monitoring costs, a
benefit of such a default rule is that it may force the board to reveal ex ante the
possibility that it might try to thwart a vote, and thereby enable shareholders to
decide in advance whether to endow the board with this power.2" Indeed, in
Inter-Tel the board had initially sought shareholder authorization to postpone
the vote in the event that approval of the merger appeared unlikely, and
shareholders voted to deny that authorization.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BLASIUS DOCTRINE
A. Board Action Designed To Entrench Itself
When directors act for the primary purpose of thwarting the ability of
shareholders to determine the composition of the board, they bear the heavy
burden of producing a compelling justification to defend their actions. Cases
involving board entrenchment have historically formed the core of the Blasius
doctrine.21 Although Chancellor Allen's discussion in Blasius of the allocation of
18. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); infra Part III.
ig. The agency cost analysis presented in this Note remains relevant notwithstanding the recent
amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) authorizing the board to
adopt a dual record date structure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (2010). Although these
amendments, by enabling the board to set a later record date for voting eligibility purposes,
may mitigate (but not eliminate) the dead vote problem, see infra Section II.A., they are
permissive rather than mandatory, and moreover, the board may still have an incentive to
postpone an imminent vote on a transaction in order to give arbitrageurs and others in favor
of the deal more time to accumulate shares. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
ao. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (discussing the utility of penalty default rules).
21. See, e.g., Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *12
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (observing that "the typical Blasius case... involves entrenchment
or control issues in which a clear conflict exists between the board and the shareholders").
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power between the principal and agent applied to all shareholder votes,22 he
noted that the issue is particularly implicated in cases "deal[ing] with the
question who should constitute the board of directors of the corporation."
23
Within this category of entrenchment cases, there are three main subcategories
of board action that have been found to impermissibly impede the exercise of
the shareholder franchise. The first subcategory, and the one most analogous
to the situation in Inter-Tel, involves board action that interferes with the
election process in order to thwart an upcoming proxy contest or consent
solicitation.24 The second involves unilateral corporate governance changes
designed to erect obstacles to shareholders seeking to replace the board at the
next election.2 ' The third type of entrenchment action that Delaware courts
have on rare occasion invalidated is a share issuance designed to dilute a
dissident shareholder.
1. Board Action Interfering with the Electoral Process
The first type of entrenchment case implicating Blasius involves board
action that tinkers with the election process in order to frustrate an imminent
vote to elect directors or otherwise thwart a dissident's campaign to replace the
board. It should be noted that shareholders' right to elect directors is in the
first instance statutory. The Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)
requires that an annual meeting of stockholders be held for the election of
directors. 6 The DGCL also bars a corporation from voting its own stock, a
prohibition born out of concern that the incumbent board might vote treasury
stock to perpetuate itself in office. 7
22. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 66o (Del. Ch. 1988); see discussion infra
Section I.B.
23. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 66o.
24. A consent solicitation is the process by which shareholders take action outside of an annual
or special meeting. Shareholders have the power to act by written consent unless the charter
provides otherwise. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 228(a) (2001).
25. See David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The Metaphysics of
Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 927, 930 (2001) (explaining that Blasius
has been triggered when the board attempts to interfere with imminent shareholder action
and when the proposed shareholder action is not imminent but the board's action prevents
shareholders from obtaining their objectives until the next election).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 211(b)-(c) (2001).
27. Id. § 16o(c); see Robert J. Klein, Note, The Case for Heightened Scrutiny in Defense of the




Occasionally, however, boards have attempted to take action that, though
not specifically prohibited by the DGCL, is nevertheless designed to thwart an
imminent shareholder vote to replace them. Since even before Blasius,
Delaware courts have been skeptical of such actions. The seminal case is Schnell
v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.2 In Schnell, the board amended its bylaws to
advance the annual meeting date in order to provide a dissident less time to
wage its proxy contest. The Delaware Supreme Court enjoined the board's
action, finding that the board had "attempted to utilize the corporate
machinery and the Delaware Law for the purpose of perpetuating itself in
office."29 Although the board's bylaw amendment did not run afoul of the
letter of the DGCL, the court admonished that "inequitable action does not
become permissible simply because it is legally possible."3"
Following Schnell, the Chancery Court in Aprahamian v. -IBO & Co.
enjoined the board's eleventh-hour attempt to postpone its annual meeting and
avoid imminent defeat in a proxy contest.31 The court rejected the board's
proffered justification that the postponement was intended to give
shareholders time to consider the board's proposal to form a special committee
to consider value-enhancing strategies for the corporation, reasoning that if the
board were sincere in its desire to ensure a fully informed vote it would not
have waited until the results of the election appeared ominous to postpone the
meeting.32 Although both Schnell and Aprahamian predate Blasius, Chancellor
Allen cited to both cases in his opinion, and one can safely assume they would
be decided the same way under Blasius's compelling justification standard.33
While the formulation of the Blasius compelling justification standard
focuses on the board's purpose, in practice Delaware courts will not engage in
Blasius review if the board's action does not have a sufficient disenfranchising
effect.34 Thus, when the board changes the date of an annual meeting that is
not imminent and in a manner that does not preclude a dissident from electing
its slate, Blasius is inapplicable. In addition, a board may adopt an advance
28. 28 5 A.2d 4 3 7 (Del. 1971).
29. Id. at 439.
30. Id.
31. 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
32. Id. at 1207.
33. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 5 64 A.2d 651, 657, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988).
34. See McBride & Gibbs, supra note 25, at 930.
35. See H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., No. Civ. A. 15650, 1997 WL 305824, at
*16 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997) (holding that the board's decision to delay its annual meeting
until after a vote on a merger agreement did not trigger Blasius review); see also Stahl v.
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notice bylaw requiring shareholders to give the board advance notice of their
intention to nominate a director or bring other business before a meeting, 6
even though such a bylaw is designed to function as an obstacle in the path of a
dissident seeking to run a proxy contest. Although Delaware courts interpret
these bylaws narrowly,37 they are common among Delaware corporations and
ordinarily do not raise disenfranchisement issues, provided that the board does
not set a meeting date that would prevent a dissident from complying with the
company's advance notice bylaw and thereby thwart its campaign to replace
the board. 
8
Thus, the board generally maintains its power to manage the electoral
process. When the board acts with the primary purpose of thwarting an
election in order to entrench itself, and its action has that effect, Blasius
scrutiny will apply. But when the board's action does not frustrate an
imminent vote and does not have the effect of preventing shareholders from
electing an insurgent slate, the requisite entrenchment motive will be deemed
lacking.
2. Corporate Governance Changes Designed To Entrench the Board
The second type of board entrenchment with which Blasius is concerned
involves midstream unilateral corporate governance changes that prevent a
dissident from proximately electing its slate. Typically this involves board
action to reinforce the company's structurally ineffective staggered board. A
staggered, or classified, board is one in which directors are divided (usually)
into three classes, with each director serving a three-year term and one class of
Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 199o) (holding that Blasius was not
triggered when the Apple Bancorp board, in response to a simultaneous tender offer and
proxy contest, set the annual meeting date for later than it had originally planned).
36. Absent an advance notice bylaw, shareholders can bring any matter that is "proper" for
shareholder action before an annual meeting without notice. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b)
(2001).
37. See Jana Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335 (Del. Ch. 2008); Levitt
Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 3622-VCN, 20o8 WL 1724244 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 20o8).
38. See Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 9o6, 913-14 (Del. Ch. 198o) (invalidating the
board's decision to set a date for the annual meeting sixty-three days in the future in the face
of a bylaw requiring that a dissident notify the board of his intention to nominate directors
seventy days in advance of the annual meeting). In some circumstances the board may also
have an affirmative obligation to waive a preexisting advance notice bylaw to allow a tardy
dissident to present its slate. See Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., No. 11779,




directors up for election each year.39 The default rule under the DGCL is that
directors on a staggered board can be removed only for cause.40 Therefore,
assuming the staggered board is effective, it operates as a potent takeover
defense by forcing any bidder seeking control of the board to wait and win two
annual elections.4 ' For a staggered board to be an effective takeover defense,
however, there must be a provision in the company's charter that prohibits
shareholders from amending the bylaws to increase sufficiently the size of the
board and then filling the empty seats. Similarly, the staggered board should
be established in the company's charter rather than in its bylaws; otherwise a
dissident can run a proxy contest to amend the bylaws and declassify the
board.42 If any of these conditions is not satisfied, then the company's
staggered board will not be an effective takeover defense, in which case the
board may try to remedy these defects unilaterally, as in the cases discussed
below. However, such unilateral action by the board is potentially in tension
with the spirit of the DGCL, which allocates to shareholders an essential veto
power concerning the decision to adopt a staggered board by providing that, if
it is not established in the charter or initial bylaw, it can only be subsequently
adopted through a charter amendment or a shareholder-adopted bylaw, each of
which requires a shareholder vote.43
Indeed, the Delaware courts have implicitly interpreted this provision of
the DGCL broadly by applying Blasius review to board action that attempts to
fortify a structurally ineffective staggered board without shareholder approval.
Blasius itself involved such an attempt. After learning of Blasius's intention to
solicit shareholder consents to amend Atlas's bylaws and increase the size of its
staggered board from seven to fifteen members (the maximum allowable under
Atlas's charter) in order to fill the newly created positions and elect a majority
slate, the Atlas board responded by increasing the size of the board by two seats
39. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (Supp. 2008).
40. Id. § 141(k)(1) (2001).
41. Shareholders might rationally adopt an effective staggered board because it forces potential
acquirers to negotiate with the board, particularly if the company has a poison pill in place
as well. This allows the board to manage a process, such as an auction, with the goal of
selling the company to the highest bidder. See, e.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is
That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 819, 830 (2002). But see Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. RaV. 887, 937-39 (2002) (finding that
companies with an effective staggered board sell themselves less frequently and generate
lower expected returns for shareholders).
42. Shareholders have the power to amend the bylaws under section lo9(a) of the DGCL. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § log(a) (2001).
43. Id. S 141(d) (Supp. 2008).
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and filling them with directors who would not be up for election at the next
meeting. Because the expansion was designed to prevent Blasius from taking
control of the board through its consent solicitation, 44 the court invalidated the
board's action.41
In MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., the Delaware Supreme Court
invalidated a similar though less preclusive act by the Liquid Audio board. 
6
Liquid Audio's bylaws provided for a five-person staggered board consisting of
three classes of directors. MM Companies announced its intention to nominate
candidates to fill the two seats that were up for election and to submit a
proposal to amend the bylaws (which required a supermajority vote of
shareholders to amend) to increase the size of the board by four members and
elect four of their nominees to fill the newly created seats, and thereby obtain
control of the board. When it became clear that MM's nominees would be
elected to the two seats up for election, the board amended the bylaws to
increase the size of the board from five to seven and proceeded to fill the two
vacancies. Unlike the situation in Blasius, this would not impact MM's ability
to obtain control of the board if its bylaw passed, 47 but was instead designed to
minimize the impact of the election of MM's nominees to the board by diluting
their presence.4s The Delaware Supreme Court nevertheless found that Blasius
applied since the board acted for the primary purpose of interfering with the
effective exercise of the shareholder franchise,49 and held the board's action
invalid."s
44. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 5 64 A.2d 651, 655 (Del. Ch. 1988).
4s. A more blatant case of impermissible disenfranchisement is Hilton Hotels Corp. v. ITT Corp.,
978 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Nev. 1997), in which the ITT board, in response to Hilton's
announced plan to commence a tender offer coupled with a proxy contest, spun off ninety-
three percent of the company's assets into a new corporation with a staggered board. The
court, applying Delaware law, held that ITT's unilateral attempt to classify the board
violated Blasius. Id. at 1349, 1352. See also Chesapeake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000)
(enjoining, under Blasius, the board's decision, after learning of a dissident's plan to amend
the company's bylaws and declassify the board, to preemptively amend the bylaws to
eliminate the ability of shareholders to remove directors without cause, eliminate
shareholders' ability to fill vacancies on the board, and most importantly to require a
supermajority shareholder vote to amend the bylaws in the future).
46. 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003).
47. Liquid Audio's charter did not cap the size of the board at nine directors, so if MM's bylaw
had passed, the board would have had eleven directors, of whom six would have been MM's
nominees. Id. at 1124.
48. Id. at 1125.
49. Id. at 1131-32.
50. As Professors Kahan and Rock argue, whether or not Blasius and Liquid Audio were rightly




Notwithstanding the decisions in Blasius and Liquid Audio, reasonable
corporate governance changes that make it only marginally harder for a
dissident to replace the board will not be evaluated under Blasius."' This is
consistent with the approach that courts take in the electoral process
context" - in practice, they do not invoke Blasius when the effect of the board's
action is not sufficiently disenfranchising 3 - and reflects judicial recognition of
the heavy burden that a board bears in attempting to demonstrate a compelling
justification for its actions once Blasius has been triggered. 4
3. Share Issuances Designed To Disenfranchise a Dissident
The final type of board action that has rarely but occasionally been found to
impermissibly interfere with the potential exercise of the shareholder franchise
to replace the board involves share issuances that dilute the voting power of a
dissident."5 Issuing shares is fundamentally different from board action that
tinkers with the election process or corporate governance changes designed to
entrench the board in that the former involves what is ostensibly a business
decision within the domain of section 141 of the DGCL, which empowers the
board to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. 6 Indeed, the
ineffective: "[I]f one interprets the adoption of the staggered board as a shareholder
commitment to a governance structure that requires winning two contested elections in
order to gain control, then the board's actions can be justified as protecting and
implementing that structure, albeit with a certain tardiness." Marcel Kahan & Edward B.
Rock, Precommitment and Managerial Incentives: Corporate Constitutionalism: Antitakeover
Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 510 (2003).
51. See In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 469, 486-87 (Del. Ch.
2000) (declining to apply Blasius review to various corporate governance changes, including
eliminating the ability of shareholders to act by written consent or call a special meeting).
52. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
53- See McBride & Gibbs, supra note 25, at 930.
54. See Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) (explaining that Blasius has been
"applied rarely" because of its potency).
s. Cases involving stock issuances intended to entrench management might be seen as
doctrinally distinct from Blasius cases. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How To Prevent
Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58
EMORY L.J. 713, 731 (2009) (describing the stock issuance cases and the cases following
Blasius as "[t]wo overlapping lines of Delaware cases"). But subsequent cases evaluating
challenges to dilutive share issuances have specifically invoked Blasius, albeit in upholding
the board's action. See infra notes 58-59.
S6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
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DGCL specifically authorizes the board to issue stock.' Because even a share
issuance that dilutes the voting power of a dissident can often be justified by
reference to its capital-raising benefits,"s Delaware courts are generally
reluctant to subject share issuances to the rigor of Blasius review.59
When a decision to issue shares is made hastily and does not actually raise
capital for the corporation, however, courts are more likely to find an
impermissible purpose.6" In Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., Condec made a
tender offer for Lunkenheimer and, when it appeared that a majority of
shareholders were going to tender, Lunkenheimer negotiated a stock purchase
agreement under which it issued 75,000 shares to U.S. Industries in exchange
for 75,000 shares of the latter's preferred stock.6' The purchase agreement was
contingent on a subsequent sale of substantially all of Lunkenheimer's assets to
U.S. Industries. 6' Noting that the share issuance "brought no money into the
Lunkenheimer treasury," the Chancery Court concluded that the board's
primary purpose was to disenfranchise Condec by diluting its voting power
and thus enjoined the share issuance. 6' However, Condec appears to be the
57. Id. § 151(a). The board's ability to issue shares is limited by the New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ rules, which require a shareholder vote if the board issues twenty percent or
more of its outstanding common or voting shares, other than as part of a public offering.
NASDAQ, INC., NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RuLEs, EQUITY R_ 5635(a)(1) (2010), available
at http ://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlafformViewer.asp ?selectednode=
chp%5F1%SF% 5F4 %sF2&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F;
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 312.03(c) (2010), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/
PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5Fi%5F4&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2
Dsections%2F.
S8. See Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting
Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 1181
(2005); McBride & Gibbs, supra note 25, at 939.
5g. See, e.g., Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183-84 (Del. Ch. 1993) (declining to apply
Blasius to a stock issuance that diluted the holdings of a dissident on the ground that the
issuance was the outgrowth of a long-term plan to raise new capital for the corporation).
6o. When a corporation issues high-vote stock the board may have trouble arguing that its
primary purpose is to raise capital. See Packer v. Yampol, No. C.A. 8432, 1986 WL 4748
(Del. Ch. Apr. 18, 1986). The New York Stock Exchange rules prohibit companies from
issuing high-vote shares if they already have a class of shares listed on the exchange. See
N.Y. STOCK EXCH., INC., supra note 57, § 313.00.
61. 230 A.2d 769, 772-73 (Del. Ch. 1967).
62. Id. at 774-75.




exception that makes the rule: legitimate capital-raising share issuances, even if
dilutive, do not trigger Blasius.
6 4
B. Board Action Designed To Thwart a Vote on a Transaction
This Note has thus far examined Blasius in the context of board
entrenchment, which is its archetypal form. But Chancellor Allen's discussion
in Blasius of the allocation of power between the board and shareholders
extended beyond entrenchment cases. According to the Chancellor, this
allocation is implicated "in every instance in which an incumbent board seeks to
thwart a shareholder majority."65 Chancellor Allen presumably did not mean that
boards are bound to adhere to the will of shareholders whenever they express
it, as through a precatory proposal recommending that the board take a certain
action or adopt a particular policy, 66 or that certain business decisions are not
within the purview of the board's exclusive authority even if a majority of
shareholders disagrees with the board. 6' But when the board acts to thwart a
vote on a matter on which the DGCL or the corporation's charter or bylaws
entides shareholders to vote, the principles underlying Blasius remain
applicable.
There is a dearth of case law concerning the application of Blasius to votes
on transactions. The leading case is Wisconsin Investment Board v. Peerless
Systems Corp.68 Peerless involved an annual meeting at which shareholders were
64. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 55, at 733.
65. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 5 64 A.2d 651, 660 (Del. Ch. 1988) (emphasis added).
66. Because of the ease which with shareholders can include precatory proposals on the
company's proxy statement under Rule 14a-8, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2009), such
proposals have become a popular avenue for proposing corporate governance and social
responsibility changes.
67. An unresolved issue in Delaware is whether shareholders have the power to adopt a bylaw
requiring the board to eliminate its poison pill, which is a common takeover defense among
public companies. See Jonathan R. Macey, The Legality and Utility of the Shareholder Rights
Bylaw, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835 (1998); supra note 7 and accompanying discussion. A poison
pill gives shareholders the right to purchase a certain number of shares of preferred stock in
the company. This right becomes a right to purchase common stock in the company at a
discount to the then-prevailing market price upon the occurrence of a triggering event,
typically defined to be the acquisition of a specified percentage of the company's stock.
Rights held by the bidder, upon the purchase of such shares, become non-exercisable. As
such, the bidder would suffer significant dilution if it proceeded with a tender offer.
68. No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000). The only other case on point
prior to Inter-Tel is In re MONY Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch.
2004), which, despite adopting a somewhat narrow reading of Peerless, confirmed the
general applicability of Blasius to votes on transactions. See infra Subsection II.B.3.
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to vote on a board proposal to increase the number of shares available for
issuance through the company's option plan. When it appeared that the
proposal was likely to be defeated, the company's CEO adjourned the meeting
for thirty days without closing the polls, as permitted by the company's
bylaws. 69 At the reconvened meeting the proposal passed by a slim margin.
70
The plaintiff, an institutional shareholder, brought suit claiming, inter alia,
that the board impermissibly interfered with the shareholder franchise, and
moved for summary judgment.7'
Chancellor Chandler first found that the primary purpose behind the
adjournment was to interfere with the shareholder vote in an effort to secure
passage of the proposal, and that such interference triggered Blasius review. He
rejected the board's alternative explanation that the purpose of the
adjournment was to increase voter turnout, in part based on trial testimony
indicating that the adjournment was intended to give the board more time to
solicit "yes" votes.72 The board argued that Blasius was nevertheless
inapplicable because, unlike the typical entrenchment case in which directors
have an inherent interest in retaining their jobs, the Peerless board was
disinterested with respect to the vote. Chancellor Chandler rejected this narrow
reading of Blasius, explaining that "[t]he derivation of board power from
shareholders, as well as the allocation of power with respect to governance of
the corporation, are broad structural concerns within the corporate form that
are present in any shareholder vote."'I
Having found Blasius applicable, the Chancellor then assessed a number of
proffered justifications and defenses for the adjournment. He rejected the
board's argument that no disenfranchisement occurred because the vote was
subsequently held. The later vote, he reasoned, was not dispositive since it was
not clear whether the ratification was fairly effected in light of the plaintiffs
allegation that the board solicited "yes" votes during the adjournment.
Chancellor Chandler also dismissed, citing Schnell, the board's argument that
the adjournment should be upheld since it was legally consistent with the
company's bylaws. 74 Finally, the Chancellor rejected the board's lesser-evils
argument that the alternative to an adjournment would have been to let the
69. Peerless, 2000 WIL 1805376, at *3-4.
70. Id. at *1.
71. Id.
72. Id. at *11.
73. Id. at *13. Chancellor Chandler also noted that, although the record was unclear, there was
some evidence that Peerless directors stood to gain from the option issuance. Id.




shareholders vote down the proposal and then submit it for a new vote, which
would have been costlier than adjourning the vote, concluding that cutting
costs was "not a compelling reason to forego the legally required procedures."7"
Because the procedural posture of the case involved a motion for summary
judgment against the board, the Chancellor declined to determine "as a matter
of law" that Peerless could not articulate a compelling justification to support
the adjournment. 6 Nevertheless, he emphasized the "deep judicial suspicion"
of actions designed to thwart a vote even when the board has no clear conflict
of interest, and concluded that the board faced a "difficult road ahead."'
Peerless thus makes clear that the scope of Blasius is not limited to
entrenchment cases and encompasses board action designed to thwart a
shareholder vote to approve a business decision. It is important, however, not
to overstate this point. The DGCL rarely requires that shareholders ratify
transactions entered into by the board. Moreover, the most fundamental
business transaction on which shareholders are entitled to vote under the
DGCL, a merger zs can often be structured to avoid a vote, at least of the
acquirer's shareholders. 79 In a direct merger the acquirer's shareholders need
not vote provided that, inter alia, the acquirer does not issue more than twenty
percent of its common shares in connection with the merger.s Thus, an
acquirer can avoid a shareholder vote by including a sufficient amount of
nonstock consideration in the purchase price. Moreover, regardless of the
amount of stock consideration, an acquirer can also avoid a vote of its
shareholders if it structures the transaction as a triangular merger, in which it
merges the target corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary of the acquirer.
Because the acquirer (as opposed to its subsidiary)8' is not a party to the
merger and therefore not a "constituent corporation," its shareholders need not
75. Id.
76. Id. at "19.
7" Id.
78. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 2008). Shareholder approval is also required for a
sale of substantially all assets of the corporation. Id. § 271(a) (2001).
79. The target will not be able to avoid a vote of its shareholders because each share of stock
outstanding immediately prior to the merger will not be an identical outstanding share of
the surviving corporation once the target stock is converted into the merger consideration.
See id. § 251(f) (Supp. 2008).
8o. See id.
8i. Note that the subsidiary's shares are owned by the parent corporation rather than by public
stockholders.
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vote. 82 Delaware is more formalistic and less solicitous of shareholder voting
rights in this respect than are other states.
8
,
Not only can the board structure a merger to avoid a shareholder vote, it
can also, consistent with Blasius, take actions designed to thwart a transactional
vote required by the NYSE or NASDAQbut not by the company's charter or
bylaws or the DGCL. A prominent case on point is Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc.8' Time had entered into a stock-for-stock reverse triangular
merger with Warner according to the terms of which Warner would merge
into a wholly owned subsidiary of Time, with Warner emerging as the
surviving corporation. 8, In the hope of busting up the Time-Warner merger,
Paramount launched a hostile tender offer to purchase all of Time's shares.86 In
response, the Time board decided to abort its previously negotiated merger
with Warner and instead make a cash tender offer for a majority of Warner's
shares, to be followed by a back-end merger.8" Although the board's decision to
restructure the original transaction, which required a vote of Time
shareholders under the NYSE rules but not under the DGCL,88 was motivated
by a concern that Time shareholders would not authorize the share issuance,
the court upheld it as a reasonable defensive measure under Unocal,8, without
citing to Blasius once. A subsequent case expressly declined to apply Blasius in
the context of a vote required by NASDAQ but not by the DGCL or the
company's governing documents.9 ° This distinction appears to be predicated
on the fact that voting rights conferred by the rules of a stock exchange, unlike
voting rights that emanate from the DGCL or the corporation's charter or
bylaws, are not "constitutional" but instead arise from an external contract
82. See id. S 251(c). A triangular merger in which the acquirer issues more than twenty percent
of its common stock will, however, require a vote under the rules of the NYSE and
NASDAQ. See supra note 57.
83. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1200(e), 12o1(a)-(b) (West 1990 & Supp. 2010).
84. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
85. Id. at 1146.
86. Id. at 1147.
87. Id. at 1148. A back-end merger refers to a situation in which a controlling shareholder
merges the company with itself or another controlled entity and thereby eliminates the
stockholdings in the company of the minority shareholders.
88. Id. at 1146.
89. Id. at 1154.
go. See Lennane v. ASK Computer Sys., CV. A. No. 11744, 199o WL 154150, at *7-9 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 11, 199o) (holding that Blasius was not triggered when the ASK board refused to
submit a share issuance in connection with an acquisition to a shareholder vote, as required




between the corporation and the exchange which the board has the power to
breach or terminate in its business judgment.91 However, to the extent that
shareholders purchase shares in a corporation with the expectation that it will
continue to list on the NYSE or NASDAQ, they will rationally assume that the
company will continue to comply with the exchange's voting requirements. As
such, confining Blasius to constitutionally mandated votes arguably frustrates
shareholders' ex ante voting expectations.
Notwithstanding these caveats, the ultimate point remains: Blasius has
historically not been strictly limited to entrenchment cases. Both Peerless and
the expansive language in Blasius itself make clear that Blasius applies to
transactions that require a shareholder vote as a matter of corporate law. This
is true even when the board acts in good faith and is ostensibly disinterested in
the outcome of the vote.92 It is against this doctrinal backdrop that Vice
Chancellor Strine's opinion in Inter-Tel stands out as a departure. The next
Part turns to a discussion of that decision.
II. INTER-TEL V. MERCIER AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
This Part begins by summarizing the Chancery Court's decision in Inter-
Tel. It then argues that Inter-Tel cannot be reconciled with the traditional
Blasius doctrine and instead must be read as an attempt to limit the doctrine's
reach to entrenchment cases.
A. The Decision in Inter-Tel
The facts of Inter-Tel are as follows. A special committee of the board of
Inter-Tel entered into a merger agreement with Mitel and a private equity
fund. None of the members of the special committee had been promised a
post-merger position with Mitel.9" Nevertheless, Institutional Shareholder
Services (ISS), a proxy advisory firm, recommended that shareholders vote
against the deal. After it became clear that the company was not going to solicit
enough affirmative proxies to approve the merger, the special committee, on
the morning of the scheduled vote, decided to postpone the meeting and set a
new record date. Under Delaware law, only shareholders who held their shares
91. ASK Computer Sys., 199o WL 154150, at *8.
92. See Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17537, 2000 WL 1805376, at *13, *19
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
93. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786,795 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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on the record date are entitled to vote.94 The special committee's decision to
postpone the imminent vote was motivated by its belief that the merger was in
the best interests of shareholders and would be lost forever if they made the
mistake of voting against it.9s Beyond this general desire to preserve the deal
for shareholders, the board advanced several specific justifications for the
postponement.
First, a number of arbitrageurs had purchased shares after the record date
that they would be unable to vote. Arbitrageurs are institutional investors that
purchase shares of the target corporation in the market at a discount to the
announced merger price in the hope that the deal will be consummated and
they will be able to pocket the spread between the deal price and the pre-
merger stock price. By postponing the vote and setting a new record date, the
board argued that it was actually enfranchising these shareholders. 6 At the
same time, setting a later record date increased the likelihood that the merger
would be approved. This is because under Delaware law a merger must be
approved by a majority of the outstanding shares."7 Since shareholders who
purchase shares in the market after the record date cannot execute proxies,
there exists a dead vote problem: as the number of shares that have changed
hands since the record date increases, so does the required percentage of "yes"
votes (calculated as a proportion of all votes cast) needed to approve the deal.98
In other words, when a vote requires a majority of outstanding shares as
opposed to a majority of voting shares, every share sold after the record date is
equivalent in effect to a "no" vote. Moving the record date closer to the date of
the actual vote mitigates this dead vote problem by decreasing the number of
shares that will have changed hands during the period after the record date.
In addition to the "enfranchisement" justification for postponing the vote
and setting a new record date, the board presented several other arguments in
defense of the postponement. ISS had indicated that it might recommend the
merger if Inter-Tel's financial condition worsened.99 Because Inter-Tel's
tracking reports suggested that the company was likely to fall short of its
earnings projection for the quarter, postponing the vote to allow for the release
94- At the time, section 213(a) of the DGCL authorized the board to fix a record date between
ten and sixty days before the date of an annual or special meeting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 213(a) (2001).
95- Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 797.
96. Id. at 795.
97. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp. 2008).
9S. This assumes that shareholders who have sold their shares since the record date, and thus
no longer have an economic interest in the transaction, do not vote.




of this information might cause ISS to recognize the attractiveness of the deal
price and change its recommendation.' ° ° Similarly, the mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) market was beginning to "lose its froth" due to the decline
in the availability of credit, and the board believed that shareholders and ISS
would benefit from additional time to evaluate the merger in light of these
developments, all of which made it unlikely that either Mitel and its private
equity co-acquirer or any other potential bidder would be able to top the
current deal price.'0 ' Finally, a large shareholder of Inter-Tel had recently filed
proxy materials proposing a recapitalization as an alternative to the merger,
and the board wanted to give shareholders time to evaluate his proposal.' 2 As
it happened, after the postponement the company announced lower than
expected earnings, ISS changed its recommendation, and shareholders
approved the merger at the rescheduled special meeting.'0 3
A small shareholder of Inter-Tel sought a preliminary injunction against
the Mitel merger on the ground that the board acted for the primary purpose of
thwarting the ability of Inter-Tel shareholders to vote against the merger.' 4 In
evaluating the plaintiffs Blasius claim, Vice Chancellor Strine expressed
reluctance towards applying Blasius in nonentrenchment cases.' 5 Thus, the
Vice Chancellor suggested that outside of the context of a vote for directors or
on a matter involving issues of corporate control, neither Blasius nor even
Unocal reasonableness review should apply.1"6 With respect to action taken by
the board to thwart a shareholder vote touching on matters of corporate
control, such as the postponement at issue in Inter-Tel, Vice Chancellor Strine
believed that Unocal rather than Blasius was the proper test. Under Unocal,
which generally applies to defensive action taken by the board in the context of
a contest for corporate control, the board would first need to identify a
legitimate corporate objective served by the postponement, and then would
have to show that it acted reasonably in relation to that objective and that the
postponement did not preclude shareholders from exercising their right to vote
on the merger.10 7 According to the Vice Chancellor, the postponement passed
loo. Id. at 796.
1ol. See id. at 794, 796.
102. Id. at 796, 798.
103. Id. at 802-03.
104. Id. at 788, 804-05.
105. Id. at 8o8; see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 55, at 735 (noting that Inter-Tel "tried to limit
the Blasius standard to director elections").
1o6. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 812 n.78.
107. Id. at 8io-11.
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muster under Unocal. It was a reasonable means of achieving the legitimate
objective of preserving a deal that the disinterested special committee in good
faith believed was in the best interests of shareholders, and it did not preclude
shareholders from rejecting the merger at the rescheduled meeting. 'S
Because Vice Chancellor Strine recognized that Delaware Supreme Court
precedents continued to apply Blasius even in circumstances implicating
Unocal, he went on to uphold the postponement under Blasius as well. The
Vice Chancellor presented two alternate paths to sustaining the board's action
under Blasius. He first reasoned that Blasius was inapplicable because the
board's primary purpose was not to disenfranchise shareholders but rather to
give them more time to deliberate. 0' Alternatively, he found that even if
Blasius had been triggered, the special committee's desire to preserve the Mitel
deal for shareholders constituted a compelling justification." 0
B. Inter-Tel as a Narrowing of the Blasius Doctrine
This Section argues that Vice Chancellor Strine's reasoning in Inter-Tel
separately attempts to alter the traditional Blasius doctrine in two principal
ways. First, it openly seeks to replace Blasius with Unocal review when the
board takes defensive action in the context of a control contest, whether or not
the board is motivated by an entrenchment purpose. Second, it represents an
attempt, at a minimum, to confine Blasius to entrenchment cases. The
aggregate effect of these modifications would be to eliminate Blasius as a
separate doctrine in the following manner. When the board interferes with the
exercise of the shareholder franchise within the context of a potential change in
control of the corporation, Unocal rather than Blasius would govern regardless
of whether the board is alleged to have an entrenchment motive, although the
presence of such a motive would be a significant determinant of the outcome of
Unocal review."' Outside of the corporate control context, however, Unocal is
inapplicable. Moreover, board entrenchment is ipso facto not a concern when
the matter to be voted on is an ordinary business proposal that does not
implicate a possible change in corporate control or in the composition of the
board. As such the Vice Chancellor's analysis suggests that board interference
1o8. Id. at 817-18.
1o9. Id. at 818-19.
iio. Id. at 819.





with a shareholder vote outside of the corporate control context should be
evaluated under the business judgment rule rather than Blasius.11
However, Inter-Tel's attempt to completely abolish Blasius as a separate
standard of review cannot be read as having a binding legal effect because Vice
Chancellor Strine recognized that Delaware Supreme Court precedents
prevented him from collapsing Blasius into Unocal in the corporate control
context.11 3 Instead, the more doctrinally significant impact of Inter-Tel is to
subtly but substantially alter the form of Blasius review in nonentrenchment
cases in a manner that bears a closer resemblance to the business judgment rule
than to the rigorous scrutiny that Blasius has traditionally entailed.
This Section concludes by considering whether such a narrowing of the
Blasius doctrine finds precedential support in the Chancery Court's 2004
decision in In re MONY Group, Inc. Shareholder Litigation,"4 a decision upon
which Vice Chancellor Strine relied in his opinion in Inter-Tel. It argues that In
re MONY and Inter-Tel are distinguishable on the facts, and that the result in
In re MONY is potentially, though not necessarily, consistent with preexisting
Blasius doctrine. Nevertheless, both cases clearly reflect a level of discomfort
with applying Blasius outside of the entrenchment context. Part III argues that
this discomfort is unwarranted.
1. Replacing Blasius with Unocal in the Context of a Control Contest
The first way in which Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion in Inter-Tel departs
from traditional Blasius analysis is his assertion that Unocal rather than Blasius
should be the proper standard of review for defensive actions that interfere
with the shareholder franchise in the context of a contest for corporate control.
The Vice Chancellor and two other members of the Delaware judiciary, Justice
Jack Jacobs of the Delaware Supreme Court and Chancellor Allen himself,
made this argument several years ago in an article published in the Business
Lawyer." ' The crux of the argument is that the circumstances implicating
Blasius also typically involve hostile tender offers, and thus the
disenfranchising action is also a defensive action subject to Unocal."6
Moreover, they argued that the difficulty in applying Blasius stems from the
112. See id. at 811, 812 n.78.
113. Id. at 88.
114. 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004).
11S. See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A Reassessment
of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAw. 1287 (2001).
16. Id. at 1312.
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predicate question of whether the board has acted for the primary purpose of
disenfranchising shareholders. The first prong of Unocal review functions as a
proxy for this primary purpose test by requiring directors to point to a
legitimate corporate objective that their actions are intended to serve; the
second prong of Unocal prohibits actions that are preclusive or coercive and
thereby proscribes actions that have the effect of precluding shareholders from
exercising the franchise. 117 Based on this reasoning, Vice Chancellor Strine and
his co-authors consider Unocal "adequate to capture the voting franchise
concerns that animated Blasius, so long as the court applies Unocal 'with a
gimlet eye out for inequitably motivated electoral manipulations or for
subjectively well-intentioned board action that has preclusive or coercive
effects."""
To the extent that this "gimlet eye" is sufficiently discerning, the Vice
Chancellor's proposal to replace Blasius with Unocal in the context of a contest
for corporate control may be merely a matter of semantics."9 But given that
Unocal review is by nature far more deferential than Blasius review, the two
standards may lead to different outcomes in particular cases.'2° Indeed, the
Delaware Supreme Court specifically rejected this doctrinal merging in Liquid
Audio.'2' Liquid Audio, moreover, is arguably a case in which the board's action
was not preclusive under Unocal because the expansion of the board did not
prevent a dissident from gaining control of the board, but nevertheless had the
effect (and purpose) of frustrating shareholders' voting rights. 2 Thus, there
appears to be more at stake than mere semantics and doctrinal niceties in the
Vice Chancellor's attempt to collapse Blasius into Unocal in the context of
defensive action during a control contest.
117. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 807-08; Allen et al., supra note 115, at 1313-14.
118. Allen et al., supra note 115, at 1316 (quoting Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 323
(Del. Ch. 2000)).
iig. See id. at 1312 ("[I]t is difficult to unearth or even imagine a case that would be decided
differently if the analysis were conducted under the Blasius rather than the Unocal
standard.").
120. See Bradley IL Aronstam, The Interplay of Blasius and Unocal-A Compelling Problem
Justifying the Call for Substantial Change, 81 OR. L. REV. 429, 476 (2002) (noting the
Delaware judiciary's "reluctance to apply Unocal with the 'spirit of Blasius'").
121. MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1131 (Del. 2003).
122. Annette Simon, Note, MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc.: An Attempt To Clarify the




2. Limiting Blasius to Entrenchment Cases
Vice Chancellor Strine was explicit in advocating the application of Unocal
rather than Blasius to board action designed to thwart a shareholder vote in the
context of a control contest, but he was constrained by Delaware Supreme
Court precedents rebuffing prior attempts to eliminate Blasius as a stand-alone
doctrine. His second and, I suggest, more important achievement in Inter-Tel,
limiting the scope of Blasius to entrenchment cases, was accomplished more
furtively by introducing two traditionally inapplicable inquiries to the Blasius
analysis: the good faith and independence of the board. A closer look at the
part of the court's opinion upholding, on two alternate bases, the
postponement under Blasius makes it clear that the Vice Chancellor was
applying a severely watered-down version of the Blasius test, one that bears a
closer resemblance to the deferential business judgment rule than to the
traditional Blasius doctrine.
As discussed above, Vice Chancellor Strine first reasoned that Blasius was
inapplicable because the board's primary purpose in postponing the meeting
was not to disenfranchise shareholders but rather to give them more time to
make an informed decision. 23 But this reasoning confuses the threshold
question of whether Blasius has been triggered with the secondary question of
whether the board has presented a compelling justification sufficient to satisfy
Blasius's strict scrutiny. As Part I explained, although the formulation of the
Blasius test is framed in terms of the board's purpose, as a practical matter
courts have focused on the effect of the board's action rather than on its
internal mental processes. Thus, courts do not apply Blasius review when the
board's action does not have a sufficiently disenfranchising effect, regardless of
whether an inquiry into the board's purpose might reveal a design to erect
certain barriers in the path of a proposed shareholder action. 4 The corollary is
that, in determining whether Blasius review is appropriate, courts will not
entertain arguments concerning the alleged good intentions of the board when
the effect of the board's action is sufficiently disenfranchising. Traditionally,
such a disenfranchising effect has been found, and Blasius has thus been
triggered, when the board postpones an imminent vote in order to preempt a
particular outcome. 25 Any potential justifications for the postponement have
only factored in at the second stage of the analysis.
123. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 818-19 (Del. Ch. 2007).
124. See supra notes 34-38 and 51-54 and accompanying text.
125. See, e.g., Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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Thus, to the extent that the board's "purpose" is relevant to the
determination of whether Blasius review is triggered in the first place, it is only
with respect to the narrow question of whether the immediate intended effect
of the board's action is to preclude shareholders from voting a certain way,
which was undeniably the case in Inter-Tel. Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis,
by contrast, looks to the board's "purpose" at a higher level of generality.
When he concludes that the board's primary purpose was not to disenfranchise
shareholders, what he really means is that the postponement was motivated by
a legitimate business purpose; in other words, that the board's motive was
pure. Indeed, he emphasizes throughout the opinion that the board acted in
good faith.12 6 However, the good faith of directors, that is, their belief that
disenfranchising shareholders is in the best interests of the corporation, has
traditionally not been relevant to Blasius review. In Blasius itself the court
enjoined the board's action even though it found that the board acted in good
faith, concluding that action designed to interfere with a shareholder vote
"involves a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent
towards his principal," which is a question that "a court may [not] leave to the
agent finally to decide so long as he does so honestly and competently.'
27
While Vice Chancellor Strine's first approach to evaluating the board's
actions under the Blasius umbrella introduced an element of good faith to the
Blasius analysis,128 his alternate holding-that even if the postponement did
trigger Blasius review, the special committee's desire to preserve the Mitel deal
constituted a compelling justification -focused on another traditionally
irrelevant consideration: director independence. 9 At several points in the
opinion the Vice Chancellor emphasized that none of the directors on the
special committee had any personal interest in the consummation of the
transaction; 130 even Inter-Tel's CEO had nothing in his severance package that
would lead him to prefer a cash-out merger with Mitel over an alternative
transaction or no transaction.1 31 In holding that, even if Blasius applied, the
board had presented a compelling justification, Vice Chancellor Strine again
stressed the board's independence:
126. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 812 n.78, 814.
127. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 66o (Del. Ch. 1988).
128. See Justin Nemunaitis, On Good Faith and the Future of Scienter in Delaware Corporate
Law 14 (Mar. 28, 20o8) (unpublished article), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114347.
129. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 819.
130. Id. at 795, 805.




[C]ompelling circumstances are presented when independent directors
believe that: (1) stockholders are about to reject a third-party merger
proposal that the independent directors believe is in their best interests;
(2) information useful to the stockholders' decision-making process has
not been considered adequately or not yet been publicly disclosed; and
(3) if the stockholders vote no . . . the opportunity to receive the bid
will be irretrievably lost.' 32
The Chancery Court's decision in Peerless, however, implies that the
application of Blasius review does not turn on the disinterestedness of
directors.' 33 More generally, the independence of the board has traditionally
not been part of the Blasius inquiry and is arguably inapposite given the
inherent conflict of interest that Blasius identified as being present when the
board, even if independent and otherwise disinterested, acts to reallocate
power away from shareholders.'4 Moreover, a showing of director
independence does not alter the standard of review under two of Delaware's
other doctrines of heightened scrutiny -Revlon, which requires the board to
seek the best price for shareholders once it decides to sell control of the
company, 3 ' and Unocal, which applies to defensive actions in the context of a
contest for corporate control.' 6 One might ask why a showing of independence
does not end the inquiry and insulate directors from liability in these two
contexts. The plain answer is that the possibility of subtle conflicts of interest'37
132. Id. at 819 (emphasis added).
133. Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *19 (Del. Ch.
Dec. 4, 2000).
134. See also Julian Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 605, 658-59
(2007) (arguing that the business judgment rule is inappropriate in Blasius cases precisely
because the interests of shareholders conflict with those of directors with respect to voting
rights).
13s. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see also
Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (holding that a
board's Revlon duties are triggered whenever public stockholders would lose control of the
corporation as a result of the proposed transaction); In re Toys "R" Us, Inc. S'holder Litig.,
877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005) (applying Revlon to actions by an independent board in the
context of a sale of control).
136. Under Unocal analysis, director independence will not lower the standard of review but will
enhance a showing of reasonableness. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1375
(Del. 1995); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 4 9 3 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
137. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129, 170
(2009) (suggesting that shareholder voting on mergers is necessary because the risk of
director abuse is heightened in an end-game scenario).
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and the costs of board error, 8 in the context of change of control transactions
render the deferential business judgment rule inadequate to constrain agency
costs.'39 This greater potential for abuse and error is part of what animated
Blasius as well.' 40
Although good faith and independence are traditionally irrelevant for the
purposes of Blasius, they are relevant to another familiar standard of review in
Delaware law: the business judgment rule.' 4' Under the business judgment
rule, which applies to the vast majority of business decisions that boards make,
courts will not interfere with the actions of disinterested directors and will
presume that the directors were informed as to the subject of the business
decision and made a good faith determination that it was in the best interests
of the corporation. 42 Thus, based on a closer reading of Inter-Tel, it becomes
clear that although Vice Chancellor Strine purported to apply Blasius, he was
really applying a far more deferential test, something akin to the business
judgment rule. This is the central accomplishment of Inter-Tel: it represents a
major step towards limiting Blasius to entrenchment cases."'
Although the bulk of Vice Chancellor Strine's analysis was devoted to the
Unocal/Blasius distinction, the true practical import of the decision is confining
Blasius to the entrenchment context in the manner described above. This is so
for two reasons. First, as discussed above, the distinction between Unocal and
Blasius is to some extent, though to be sure not entirely, one of form rather
than substance. 44 Thus, merely replacing Blasius with Unocal would not in
itself have been sufficient to allow Vice Chancellor Strine to conclude that the
postponement in Inter-Tel passed muster under Unocal without his further
conclusion that postponing an imminent vote was a nonpreclusive and
reasonable means of preserving the Mitel merger.14 And this conclusion was
138. See QVC, 673 A.2d at 43, 45 (emphasizing the significant economic consequences of a merger
in which shareholders stand to lose their last opportunity to receive a control premium for
their shares).
139. See infra Part Il.
140. See Velasco, supra note 134, at 658-59.
141. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
142. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.zd 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
143. The Vice Chancellor made it clear that he would not entertain an argument that the board
acted in good faith if its purpose was one of entrenchment. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc.,
929 A.2d 786, 811 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("The notion that directors know better than the
stockholders about who should be on the board is no justification at all.").
144. See supra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.




clearly informed by the Vice Chancellor's view that postponing a vote in order
to preserve a transaction that the board in good faith believes to be in the best
interests of shareholders is a permissible exercise of the board's authority to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Thus the actual outcome of
the Unocal analysis in Inter-Tel did not turn on the doctrinal differences
between Unocal and Blasius review so much as on the Vice Chancellor's belief
that outside of the entrenchment context the policy rationales underlying
Blasius are not implicated. The second reason why Vice Chancellor Strine's
attempt to collapse Blasius into Unocal is of limited practical effect is that the
Vice Chancellor explicitly recognized that Delaware Supreme Court precedents
prevented him from doing so. By contrast, the Vice Chancellor was able to
confine Blasius to entrenchment cases by quietly altering the content of Blasius
analysis without formally purporting to do so.
Of course, such a narrowing cannot be squared with either Peerless or the
expansive language in Blasius itself. Vice Chancellor Strine attempted to
distinguish Peerless on the theory that in Peerless the vote could be resubmitted
to shareholders at any time even if they voted it down, whereas the Mitel
merger would be lost forever if shareholders voted against it.146 This is true,
but it is not clear which way it cuts. The reason that the option plan in Peerless
could be continuously resubmitted to a shareholder vote is that it was an
ordinary business proposal, unlike the Mitel merger. One might think that the
sanctity of the shareholder franchise would be particularly implicated in the
context of a vote on a fundamental transaction such as a merger. Thus, as the
Vice Chancellor seemed to recognize,' 4 Inter-Tel is difficult to reconcile with
Peerless or Blasius.
3. Inter-Tel and In re MONY
Although the reasoning in Inter-Tel represents a break from Peerless and
Blasius, it does find some, though only partial, precedential support in the
Chancery Court's 2004 decision in In re MONY Group, Inc. Shareholder
Litigation.'48 In In re MONY, the MONY board decided to postpone the vote on
its merger with AXA and move back the record date after fifty-two percent of
the company's shares had changed hands since the original record date.' 49 Vice
Chancellor Lamb found that the board's decision to change the record date was
146. Id. at 811 n.78.
147. Id.
148. 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004).
149. Id. at 669.
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motivated by its belief that a later record date would make shareholder
approval more likely since arbitrageurs that had purchased shares after the
original date could be expected to favor the deal.' Although the Vice
Chancellor recognized that Blasius is not limited to cases involving director
elections, he believed that it should only be applied outside of that context "in
circumstances in which self-interested or faithless fiduciaries act to deprive
stockholders of a full and fair opportunity to participate in the matter and to
thwart what appears to be the will of a majority of the stockholders, as in
[Peerless].""' Vice Chancellor Lamb distinguished Peerless on the ground that
the CEO of Peerless was interested in the option plan and that at the time of
the adjournment the option plan faced imminent defeat.' By contrast, the Vice
Chancellor found that the MONY directors were disinterested with respect to
the merger vote and acted out of a good faith belief that the approval of the
merger was in the best interests of shareholders, and indeed did not thwart the
will of the MONY shareholders who, at the time, supported the transaction.'
He thus declined to apply Blasius and upheld the postponement under the
business judgment rule.'5 4
Vice Chancellor Strine relied on In re MONY in his opinion in Inter-Tel.
The two cases are distinguishable, however, in two ways. First, the extent of
the turnover in shares that occurred after the record date in In re MONY
created a more significant dead vote problem than in Inter-Tel and arguably
presented a more compelling justification for postponement.' Second, and
more important from a doctrinal perspective, the vote in In re MONY was
arguably not imminent when the board decided to postpone it. The MONY
board issued a press release a week before the special meeting disclosing its
decision to postpone, at which time the vote tally indicated that shareholders
supported the merger."x6 By contrast, the Inter-Tel board postponed the
meeting at the eleventh hour and only when it was clear that the merger was
not going to be approved. 7 Although this might seem to be a difference
15o. Id. at 672.
151. Id. at 674.
152. Id. at 674 n.51. The court in Peerless did not actually determine that the CEO was not
disinterested with respect to the option plan. Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ.
A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000).
153. In re MOIVY, 853 A.2d at 677.
154. Id.
SS. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
156. In re MONY, 853 A.2d at 671.




merely in degree, the imminence of shareholder action is often determinative of
the outcome of the Blasius analysis. ,8 Thus, the timing of the postponement in
Inter-Tel constitutes an important difference from the facts of In re MONY for
Blasius purposes and undermines any suggestion that In re MONY qualifies as
controlling precedent.' 9
This is not to suggest that In re MONY was necessarily decided correctly on
the facts. The imminence of the vote at the time of the postponement is a proxy
for whether the postponement has a sufficient disenfranchising effect to trigger
Blasius, that is, whether the postponement thwarted the outcome of the vote
that otherwise would have transpired. This determination presents a difficult
line-drawing problem. In re MONY is a close case because at the time of the
postponement it was still uncertain whether the company would be able to
obtain proxies representing a majority of the outstanding shares, and this
uncertainty is what motivated the postponement. Inter-Tel is a much easier
case because it was clear at the time of the postponement that the deal was not
going to be approved. A disenfranchising effect, therefore, was ambiguous in
In re MONY but quite clearly present in Inter-Tel.
Additionally, although Inter-Tel and In re MONY are factually
distinguishable, In re MONY's "faithless fiduciary" language unquestionably
represents an unduly narrow reading of Peerless, and Vice Chancellors Lamb
and Strine clearly express a similar reluctance towards applying Blasius to votes
on transactions as to which the board is disinterested. Their reluctance seems
to be rooted in a common belief that directors should be allowed to display
favoritism toward a transaction that they have recommended for shareholder
approval, and that a permissible manifestation of such favoritism is the
protection of the transaction against shareholders' own voting myopia. Thus,
in In re MONY, Vice Chancellor Lamb observed that a board may employ a
variety of techniques designed to achieve a favorable outcome of a shareholder
vote to approve a merger, including utilizing corporate resources to solicit
proxies and publicize the board's views, and retaining counsel to defend its
actions in court. 6 , In Inter-Tel, Vice Chancellor Strine similarly noted that the
board is not supposed to be neutral with respect to business matters that it
submits to a shareholder vote,' 6 ' and reasoned that "[s]o long as the directors
are motivated by a good faith belief that the proposal is in the stockholders'
best interests, taking a short adjournment to gather additional votes in a fair
is8. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
iS. Vice Chancellor Strine conceded this point. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 813 n.8o.
16o. In re MONY, 853 A.2d at 675-76.
161. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 809.
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way seems like the kind of business judgment the adjournment tool was
designed to facilitate."'
62
More precisely, the Inter-Tel board's decision to postpone the special
meeting might be analogized to standard deal protections typically included in
merger agreements, such as a termination fee' 6, to be paid to the acquirer in the
event that the target's shareholders vote down the deal and the company
consummates an alternative transaction.164 Deal protections and a last-minute
postponement are both designed to insulate a transaction by making it more
costly or difficult for shareholders to reject the deal, and they thereby have a
similarly prophylactic effect of deterring interlopers from submitting
competing bids. It now appears that courts will determine the permissibility of
deal protections by applying Unocal review, 6, which might suggest that Unocal
is indeed the proper standard of review to be applied to a postponement of a
vote on a business combination.
But neither Vice Chancellor Strine's argument that directors are entitled to
favor transactions that they submit for shareholder approval nor the analogy to
deal protections and corporate spending is an entirely convincing justification
for postponing an imminent vote on a transaction. The issue is not whether the
board must remain neutral with respect to a business decision that it has
submitted to shareholders; clearly Vice Chancellor Strine is correct that the
board is entitled to be biased towards the transaction. Rather, the question is
whether the board can manifest its bias by utilizing the voting procedures put
in place by the DGCL and the company's charter and bylaws to favor approval
of the transaction. Indeed, in light of the board's relatively free reign with
respect to deal protections and its ability to use the corporate treasury to
promote a particular transaction, there would seem to be no need to grant the
board the additional power to manipulate the voting machinery in order to
obtain its preferred outcome in a vote on that transaction. Part III presents an
agency cost analysis to argue that such manipulation carries risks of abuse and
162. Id. at 812 n.78.
163. See WiLLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND
CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 581-84 (2d ed. 2007).
164. It is relatively rare for a termination fee to be triggered by a "naked" no vote, even if the
target does not consummate an alternative transaction during some specified tail period.
However, a recent Chancery Court decision suggests that a target board is permitted to
include such a trigger. See In re Lear Corp. S'holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640 (Del. Ch. 20o8)
(Strine, V.C.).
165. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). Moreover, even in
those circumstances where Revlon applies, the standard appears to be one of reasonableness.




error, and concludes that there may be good reason to continue to apply Blasius
scrutiny to board action interfering with the shareholder franchise even in
nonentrenchment cases, and in particular to a decision by the board to
postpone an imminent vote on a transaction.
III.A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF INTER-TEL
One of the most surprising aspects of the court's decision in Inter-Tel is
that the board had included on its proxy ballot a proposal that would give the
board the authority to adjourn the meeting if there were insufficient votes in
favor of the merger, and shareholders voted to deny the board this power. 166
Vice Chancellor Strine made this observation in his opinion but avoided the
issue by noting that formally the special meeting was not adjourned because it
was not convened in the first place; rather, it was postponed. 67
This Part begins with an introduction to agency theory. It then explains
how shareholder voting can be seen as a way of reducing agency costs. It goes
on to apply an agency cost analysis to demonstrate that shareholders might, as
Inter-Tel shareholders did, rationally choose to deny the board the power to
postpone an imminent vote. Finally, it argues that the law should presume that
shareholders deny the board such power unless the charter provides otherwise,
that is, unless shareholders explicitly waive Blasius review.
The analysis presented below is limited to postponements of imminent
votes on transactions, and does not address the more typical application of
Blasius to entrenchment cases. There are several reasons for limiting the scope
of the argument in this way. First, as explained in Part II, the only practical
effect of the decision in Inter-Tel is to significantly dilute the rigor of Blasius
review in nonentrenchment cases since Vice Chancellor Strine's Unocal analysis
was essentially dicta. 6 8 Second, the Vice Chancellor was quite explicit in
stating that, even under his proposed Unocal test, board action interfering with
the shareholder franchise for the purpose of entrenching the incumbent board
would be impermissible.169 Third, the proposition that allowing the board to
thwart shareholder action seeking to replace the board would significantly
166. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 804. Presumably under Inter-Tel's bylaws neither the board nor the
chairman had the power to adjourn a meeting. Id. at 804 n.38. This adjournment vote,
moreover, was based on a majority of those voting and therefore the vote was not hindered
by a dead vote problem.
167. Id. at 804.
168. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
169. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 811.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
increase agency costs is so axiomatic that it hardly seems worthy of a formal
exposition. For these reasons, this Part focuses on the more difficult and
interesting issue of whether Inter-Tel was correct to confine Blasius to
entrenchment cases.
A. Agency Costs and the Case Against Postponement
i. Background on Agency Costs
The seminal work on agency costs and their relation to the ownership
structure of the modern corporation is Michael Jensen and William Meckling's
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.'7 °
In that article, Professors Jensen and Meckling developed a model for analyzing
the costs associated with the separation of ownership and control within a firm,
the key feature of the modern corporation in which the firm's principals -its
shareholders - entrust control of the business to their agents - the directors of
the corporation.'17 I will briefly discuss that model before applying an agency
cost analysis to shareholder voting and more specifically to the decision to
prohibit the board from postponing an imminent vote on a transaction.
The central insight of agency theory is that the operating decisions of an
agent, if left unchecked, are unlikely to mirror those that would maximize the
welfare of the principal." 2 This divergence results in part from the fact that the
agent receives certain nonpecuniary benefits that do not accrue to the firm's
principal.'73 These benefits include the various perquisites that agents enjoy,
such as corporate jets and fancy offices.17 4 The conflict between a principal and
his agent also stems from the fact that the agent is typically a fixed claimant
and thus has a far weaker incentive than the principal to maximize the residual
170. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18.
171. As discussed previously, the agency analogy remains valid even though it is not clear that
the board is, legally speaking, an agent of shareholders. See supra note 7. In addition, it
should be noted that the principal-agent problem is less acute with respect to independent
directors, although even they may have a reputational (or even financial) interest in their
position on the board or professional or personal ties to the CEO that could lead them to
pursue some of the non-value-maximizing business transactions discussed below.
172. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119-25 (1932).
173. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 312.
174. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95
Itav. L. REv. 1028, 1031 n.i8 (1982) (defining agency costs to be "the decrease in a
company's value caused by the managers' divergence from profit-maximization due to their




value of the firm. '75 This can lead the agent to expend insufficient effort on
"creative activities such as searching out new profitable ventures" ;176 that is,
the agent will not exert effort until the marginal cost of that effort equals the
marginal revenue it produces because he captures only a portion, if any, of that
revenue."7 The divergent incentives of the agent and principal can also lead the
former to seek to inefficiently expand the firm to an excessive size through
"empire building," in order to enhance his personal reputation or salary or to
decrease his expendability.' 78 As the separation of ownership and control
increases, meaning as the agent's fraction of the equity of the firm becomes
smaller, his claim on the residual value of the firm falls and the divergence
between his preferred activities and those that would maximize the value of the
firm increases.' 79 This is the principal-agent problem that in varying degrees
"exists in all organizations," 18' including between shareholders and officers and
directors of a large corporation.
175. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN.
L. REv. 271, 277 (1986) ("Where management and risk bearing are separate, as in publicly
held corporations, managers' incentives to act efficiently are weak because they neither bear
the costs nor reap the benefits of their actions."); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to
Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 836-37
(1981) (arguing that management can act against the interests of shareholders in two ways:
by being inefficient, i.e., exerting insufficient effort or acting carelessly, and by
appropriating part of the corporation's earnings through excessive perquisites or engaging
in self-dealing).
176. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 313.
17. Market forces may successfilly limit this second conflict between managers and
shareholders. If managers can be replaced at little cost, then agency costs are likely to be
lower. Id. at 328-29. More generally, the market for corporate control can constrain agency
costs, since a company whose stock is undervalued due to an ineffective management team
is susceptible to a tender offer or proxy contest. See Gilson, supra note 175, at 839-42.
However, the prevalence of the poison pill, which as a practical matter requires a hostile
bidder to couple its tender offer with a proxy contest to replace the board and redeem the
pill, and the relative unattractiveness of proxy contests (dissidents typically only get
reimbursed if they succeed in replacing the board) render the market for corporate control
an imperfect mechanism for reducing agency costs. See id. at 843-45.
178. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 179-8o (loth ed. 2007); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REv. 597, 627 (1989); see also Gary Gorton, Matthias Kahl & Richard
J. Rosen, Eat or Be Eaten: A Theory of Mergers and Firm Size, 54 J. FIN. 1291, 1293 (2009)
(discussing the possibility of inefficient defensive acquisitions when managers reap private
benefits from retaining control of the corporation).
179. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 313.
i8o. Id. at 309.
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Jensen and Meckling formalized their model by defining agency costs to be
the sum of three components: monitoring costs, bonding costs, and the
residual loss., s, Monitoring costs are expenditures by the principal designed to
more closely align the activities of the agent with those that maximize the value
of the firm. '82 Bonding costs are expenditures that managers of a firm make as
a way of committing to limit their activities in order to reduce the possibility
that they may act contrary to the interests of shareholders. 8 1 The residual loss
refers to the reduction in the value of the firm due to the divergence between
the agent's actions and those that would maximize the welfare of the principal
that remains even after the optimal level of monitoring and bonding costs have
been incurred. s4
Monitoring costs and bonding costs differ only in the identity of the actor
making the expenditure (the principal in the case of monitoring costs and the
agent in the case of bonding costs); in either case the principal ultimately bears
the cost in the form of a reduction in the earnings of the firm.' Moreover,
because in a large corporation even bonding expenditures are made out of the
corporate treasury rather than out of managers' own pockets, the distinction
between monitoring costs and bonding costs is not particularly well defined or
informative. As such, this Note will use the term monitoring costs to refer
generally to costly governance mechanisms designed to reduce residual agency
costs associated with the separation of ownership and control of the
corporation.
Some monitoring costs are pecuniary and entail direct and tangible
expenditures, whereas others may be more subtle. Common examples of
pecuniary monitoring costs in large public corporations include analyst
research reports and reports by corporate governance rating agencies, such as
ISS, which are commissioned by shareholders to track the performance of
boards and management teams of public companies.8 6 The fees paid to an
accounting firm to audit the company, fees paid to rating agencies, and the
costs of independent directors are also examples of direct monitoring costs.,
87
The use of performance-based compensation structures, such as stock and




185. Id. at 325.
186. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 175, at 277-78.




options, in lieu of a fixed salary is also a kind of monitoring cost."' A less
obvious type of monitoring cost, to which I turn in the following Section, is
shareholder voting. For the purposes of this Note, the most important
monitoring costs, and indeed some of the most common, are contractual
limitations on managerial discretion, which "impose costs on the firm because
they limit [the manager's] ability to take full advantage of some profitable
opportunities,' 8' but also reduce the residual loss to the extent that managers
might otherwise use that discretion to appropriate value from shareholders.
With this background, the following two Subsections apply Jensen and
Meckling's agency cost framework to two specific issues: shareholder voting
generally and postponements of shareholder votes. These Subsections argue
that voting and a prohibition on postponements of imminent votes are both
governance mechanisms that entail monitoring costs but may reduce residual
agency costs as well.
2. Agency Costs and Shareholder Voting
The existence of shareholder voting can itself be seen as the product of
agency cost considerations. Although Delaware law gives the board
considerable discretion to manage the business affairs of the corporation, the
DGCL requires that shareholders approve certain fundamental transactions,
principally mergers and sales of substantially all assets of the corporation. 9 ° A
corporation may also decide to expand voting rights in its charter or bylaws.
Given the presumptive benefits that flow from vesting corporate power in a
central decisionmaker,' 9 ' one might ask why shareholders vote at all. "92 The
188. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 18, at 323. Incentive compensation is costly to the extent
that it is dilutive for the company to issue stock instead of paying managers in cash.
189. Id. at 325.
19o. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c), 271(a) (2001 & Supp. 2008).
igi. See Bainbridge, Nexus, supra note 7, at 2o-21 (arguing that a central body "capable of
exercising fiat" reduces the coordinating costs associated with the "asymmetries of
information and interests among the corporation's various constituencies" and even among
a single constituency-shareholders). Bainbridge recognizes that because of accountability
concerns the board should not have unfettered authority and thus implicitly endorses
shareholder voting. See id. at 32.
192. By posing the question this way I do not mean to ask why shareholders in particular, as
opposed to employees or creditors, vote. Rather, I take as a premise, as does Delaware law,
that shareholders as residual claimants have the proper incentives to monitor the board. See
infra note 193. This premise has been criticized for failing to adequately consider the
interests of other constituents of the firm. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REv. 1189 (2002).
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best answer is that shareholder voting is an accountability mechanism: it
allows shareholders to monitor the board and thereby reduces the residual
agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control.' 93 This
also explains why shareholder voting is confined to fundamental transactions
(aside from the election of directors); these are the situations in which the
potential for abuse and the costs of board error are likely to be the greatest.'
94
Shareholder voting is thus a type of monitoring cost. It forces the company
to expend resources in order to minimize the divergence between the board's
actions and those that would maximize value for shareholders. These
expenditures include the tangible costs of furnishing shareholders with a
detailed proxy statement that complies with the proxy rules promulgated by
the SEC pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,'9' and the less
tangible costs associated with directors diverting their attention away from
business matters and towards preparing for the vote. In the case of a merger
they also comprise the costs of drafting the merger agreement to account for
(i) the possibility that shareholders may vote down the deal in favor of an
alternative transaction, and (2) the inevitable delay between signing and
closing that the vote imposes.6 The former may include a termination fee to
be paid to the acquirer if shareholders vote down the deal and the company
enters into an alternative transaction within a specified period of time. 97 The
latter includes the costs associated with the target's interim operating
covenants, in which it promises not to undertake certain operational changes in
the period between signing and closing without the acquirer's consent,'9g as
well as the possibility that the target will suffer a material adverse change
193. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395,
416 (1983) ("[R]eduction of agency costs is the most probable explanation for shareholders'
voting on fundamental corporate changes. Shareholders, as residual claimants, have the
most to lose (or to gain) as a result of fundamental corporate changes."); see also Thompson
& Edelman, supra note 137, at 132-33 (arguing that voting reduces error costs associated with
decisionmaking and allows principals to monitor their agents).
194. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 193, at 416.
195. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)-(c) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 24o.14a-3 (2009).
196. Even in the absence of shareholder voting the need for regulatory approval (such as antitrust
approvals) might impose some delay between signing and closing, but submitting the deal
to a vote usually substantially increases this delay.
197. See generally ALLEN ET AL., supra note 163, at 581-84 (discussing deal protections).
198. See, e.g., JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER: STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES FOR
NEGOTIATING CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 155 (1975); 2 Lou R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT,




during that period'99 or otherwise fail to satisfy any of a number of closing
conditions and thereby give the buyer the right to walk from the deal.2"' The
decision to give shareholders the power to vote in certain circumstances
represents an a priori judgment by the Delaware Legislature and, to the extent
that firms expand voting rights voluntarily, by corporations themselves that
these monitoring costs are outweighed by the benefits they produce by
reducing residual agency costs and that the net effect of shareholder voting is
thus to reduce overall agency costs. This judgment is also implicit in
Chancellor Allen's discussion in Blasius of the allocation of power between
principal and agent." 1
3. Agency Costs Associated with Postponing a Vote
Just as agency costs help explain why shareholders vote on fundamental
transactions, a similar agency cost analysis can be applied to a decision by
shareholders to prohibit the board from postponing an imminent vote on such
a transaction 02 A rule that prevents the board from postponing a vote on a
transaction imposes certain monitoring costs on the firm but also reduces
residual agency costs. The board may have better information than
shareholders about the benefits of the transaction, and a postponement might
allow the board to disseminate that information to shareholders. 0 3 If
shareholders vote against the transaction without the benefit of that
information, then the board will either need to submit the matter to a vote
again, which is costly and takes time,"' or, in the case of a merger,
shareholders may lose the deal forever, since a merger agreement typically
19g. See Kenneth A. Adams, Understanding "Material Adverse Change" Provisions, M&A LAw., June
2006, at 3.
2oo. See 1 KLING & NUGENT, supra note 198, § 1.05.
201. This agency cost analysis might not explain Chancellor Allen's second argument that the
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning of the board's authority and
legitimates that authority. See Andrew C. Houston, Blasius and the Democratic Paradigm in
Corporate Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 843, 848-50 (1992) (arguing that Blasius's "legitimacy
argument" rejects an explanation of shareholder voting as a mechanism for monitoring
directors and instead rests on "a more general political or ethical theory").
202. One scholar has argued that the board has a fiduciary duty to facilitate successful
shareholder votes even though they may lead to bad outcomes for the corporation. Ethan G.
Stone, Business Strategists and Election Commissioners: How the Meaning of Loyalty Varies with
the Board's Distinct Fiduciary Roles, 31 J. CORP. L. 893, 928-29 (2006).
203. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786,796 (Del. Ch. 2007).
204. But see Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. Civ. A. 17637, 2000 WL 1805376, at *15
(Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (rejecting this justification for a postponement).
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terminates once the target's shareholders vote it down."' Each of these
possibilities represents a potential monitoring cost.
On the other hand, a prohibition on such postponements may reduce
residual agency costs because the board may be acting against shareholders'
interests when it postpones an imminent vote on a transaction. This may be
the case for two reasons, one benign and one less so.
The first reason why prohibiting the board from postponing an imminent
vote on a transaction may reduce residual agency costs is that the board may in
good faith think that a transaction is in shareholders' interests when in fact it is
not. If this is the case, then shareholders incur at least two kinds of costs as a
result of the postponement. The first type of cost is a consequence of the fact
that the board will likely resolicit proxies after the postponement, a process
which entails direct expenditures and, perhaps more importantly, distracts the
board from overseeing the operations of the business. The second potential
type of cost is that, at least in the case of a merger, arbitrageurs, who have a
vested financial interest in the consummation of the transaction, may buy up
shares in the company and the merger may get approved at the rescheduled
meeting even if it is not in the interests of shareholders. o6 This will hurt those
shareholders who held on to their shares after the postponement. It will also
hurt shareholders who otherwise would have held on to their shares but,
sensing board misconduct, decided to abandon their investment and sell their
shares in the market, where the purchasers are likely to include arbitrageurs.
The second reason why the postponement might impose a cost on
shareholders is more blatant. The board might have a personal interest in the
transaction, or it might be influenced by senior managers who have such an
205. See 2 KLING & NUGENT, supra note 198, § 15A.02.
2o6. In Inter-Tel, Vice Chancellor Strine found as a matter of fact that the reason the merger was
approved at the rescheduled meeting was not because the base of eligible voters had
changed but because shareholder sentiment with respect to the benefits of the merger had.
929 A.2d at 803. The argument that arbitrageurs would be willing to vote for a merger that
does not maximize the long-term value of their shares ultimately rests on an empirical
assumption, the confirmation of which is beyond the scope of this Note. But given the
extremely short time horizons of their investments, there is reason to believe that the
interests of arbitrageurs differ from those of buy and hold shareholders in material respects.
Moreover, because the essential business model of merger arbitrage involves an attempt to
exploit the price differential between the merger consideration and the company's stock
price, it seems reasonable to assume that arbitrageurs are likely to be satisfied by locking in
an immediate profit, particularly if the alternative is searching for a better acquisition, which
could take a considerable amount of time. See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock,
Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 15 5 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1083-87
(2007) (discussing the possibility that hedge funds-of which merger arbitrageurs are a




interest. For example, certain managers may support an inefficient merger if
they expect to have a higher paying or more prestigious position in the
surviving entity, or if that position offers greater job security because the
combined entity will be larger and thus harder to take over.2° 7 Managers, who
tend to be less diversified than shareholders because much of their personal
wealth is linked to the success of the corporation in the form of salary and
incentive compensation,o 8 might also favor an inefficient merger with a firm in
a different industry in order to diversify the corporation's income sources. In
any of these scenarios, a postponement will again impose two kinds of costs on
shareholders. First, the company will engage in costly resolicitation efforts.
Second, because a postponement increases the voting power of persons
supporting the transaction, including arbitrageurs, a transaction that is
inefficient for any of the reasons stated above may nonetheless be approved at
the rescheduled meeting even if the original shareholder base opposed the deal.
In that case, the postponement will extract wealth from shareholders and
transfer it to management or the board."°9
This second way in which a postponement might be costly for
shareholders, namely the possibility that the board may favor an inefficient
transaction for self-serving reasons, arguably renders one of the justifications
behind the postponement in Inter-Tel less convincing: the claim that setting a
new record date actually enfranchises those shareholders who bought shares
after the original record date. 1° The problem with this argument is that it
proves too much. Every record date disenfranchises shareholders that
subsequently purchase shares,"' but the board is never required to move the
207. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
2o8. See Black, supra note 178, at 627.
209. Some of these examples might be said to involve entrenchment motives in the sense that
they present situations in which directors or senior managers support a transaction that they
expect will provide them with greater job security. However, for Blasius purposes this is a
much more subtle and thus fundamentally different kind of entrenchment motive than
exists when the board interferes with a shareholder vote to replace the board, rather than
with a vote concerning a transaction. In the former situation, an entrenchment motive exists
on its face. In the latter situation, by contrast, it may not be at all apparent that the board
possesses such an entrenchment motive.
210. Inter-Tel, 929 A.2d at 795.
211. Record dates also create the potential for "empty voting" by enabling certain shareholders to
attain voting rights that are disproportionate to their economic ownership of the
corporation. See Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty
Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 629 (2008). Although in practice
shareholders who sell after the record date are unlikely to vote, record dates will still alter
the one-to-one ratio between economic interest and voting power by increasing the
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record date to a subsequent time when doing so would be contrary to its
interests. An example of a situation in which the board would be disadvantaged
by pushing the record date back is a consent or proxy solicitation 2 12 to remove
directors, in which case a later record date increases the number of eligible
voters and thereby makes it more likely that the dissident will execute consents
or votes from a majority of outstanding shares.' 3 Another example might be a
proxy contest to elect a new slate. In that circumstance, while an early record
date does not create a dead vote problem 4 because director elections are
determined based on voting shares rather than outstanding shares,215 shares
may have moved into the hands of antimanagement activists after the record
date. More generally, the board would not push back the record date for any
vote on a transaction that the board favored and that appeared likely to
succeed, provided that the vote required a majority of voting shares rather than
a majority of outstanding shares. To the extent that a board might act out of
self-interest, the selective ability to manipulate the record date can be seen as a
tool of abuse.
Indeed, the Delaware General Corporation Law has been amended,
effective August 2009, in a manner that further undermines the
"enfranchisement" justification for postponing an imminent vote. Section
213(a) now permits the board to establish dual record dates-one for the
purposes of determining the stockholders entitled to receive notice of the
meeting and a second later date for determining the stockholders eligible to
vote.16 To the extent that this amendment empowers boards to preempt a
significant dead vote problem ex ante, it eliminates any supposed need to allow
them to use the postponement power to accomplish the same result ex post. In
this respect, the amendment arguably reflects a preference for fixed rules
proportionate voice of shareholders that owned their shares on the record date and held on
to them, at least if the vote is based on a majority of shares voting rather than outstanding.
212. The board is authorized to adopt a bylaw establishing the authority of the board, within ten
days of the commencement of a consent solicitation, to set a record date, which must in turn
be within ten days following the adoption of the resolution fixing the record date. DEL.
CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 213 (b) (2001); see Eric S. Robinson, Defensive Tactics in Consent
Solicitations, 51 Bus. LAw. 677, 679 (1996).
213. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(k), 228(a) (2001). Because each of these actions requires a
majority of the outstanding shares, an earlier record date exacerbates the dead vote problem
and makes it less likely that the removal campaign will succeed. See supra notes 97-98 and
accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
215. DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 8, S 216 (2001).




regarding the electoral process over ad hoc board action. 17 This preference
might be a function of the latter's greater potential for strategic behavior, and
parallels the argument for allowing shareholders to decide ex ante whether to
permit or prohibit board postponements of imminent votes. I now turn to a
model of that decision process and examine the conditions under which the
reduction in residual agency costs that a prohibition on last-minute
postponements entails might justify the incremental monitoring costs
associated with such a prohibition.
B. Modeling Shareholders' Decision
If one assumes that a court may be unable to detect either subjectively well-
intentioned postponements that are not in the interests of shareholders or
postponements of transactions that are inefficient and in which the board has a
hidden personal interest, then, in deciding ex ante whether to prohibit the
board from postponing an imminent vote, shareholders must weigh the
residual agency costs associated with a postponement against the monitoring
costs that such a prohibition would entail. This decision can be modeled as
follows:
Let P(P) be the probability that the board will postpone an imminent vote.
P(P) will be a function of whether the opportunity to postpone a vote presents
itself, which will in turn depend on the likelihood that the board enters into
transactions that require shareholder approval, such as a merger. P(B) is the
conditional probability that, given that the board postpones a vote, the
postponement imposes net costs on shareholders and is thus not in their
interests. P(B) is determined by the probability that the board incorrectly
believes that the postponement is in the interests of shareholders, call this
P(M) to indicate the board's good faith mistake, and the probability that the
board knows that the postponement is bad for shareholders but acts out of self-
interest, call this P(I). Thus, P(B) = P(M) + P(I). C(M) represents the cost to
shareholders of a good faith mistake, and C(I) is the cost to shareholders of the
board's self-interest. As discussed above, C(M) reflects the costs of resoliciting
217. Although section 213(a) permits the board to establish a new record date in the event of an
adjournment, see id., it says nothing about whether the board can use the adjournment or
postponement power for the purpose of changing the composition of the stockholder voting
base in order to thwart the outcome of an imminent vote. Indeed, the legislative history
disclaims any intention to give the board greater flexibility to tinker with the voting process
ex post, explaining that the "amendment is not intended to affect application of the doctrine
expressed in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc." H.B. 19, 14 5th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2009)
(synopsis).
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proxies, which include direct expenditures and the indirect costs associated
with the distraction of the board and management from overseeing the
business, as well as the possibility that the transaction, even if it is not in the
interests of shareholders, may be approved at the reconvened meeting because
of the increased presence of arbitrageurs." 8 C(I) similarly encompasses the
costs of resoliciting proxies and the incremental costs that shareholders incur
when a postponement, by increasing the voting power of arbitrageurs,
increases the likelihood of approval of an inefficient transaction in which
management will appropriate wealth from shareholders. Let P(D) represent
the conditional probability that the court correctly detects that a postponement
is not in the interests of shareholders; for simplicity, I assume that this
probability of detection is independent of whether the board acts mistakenly
but in good faith or out of concealed self-interest." 9 P(ED) is the conditional
probability that, given a beneficial postponement, the court erroneously
identifies it as being against shareholders' interests; P(ED) is thus a kind of
false positive. Let L represent the costs that shareholders incur in litigating a
postponement in court. These costs include attorneys' fees in challenging and
defending the postponement, either or both of which may be borne by the
corporation depending on the outcome of the litigation,"' as well as the
opportunity costs associated with the distraction of management during the
pendency of the litigation. 1 Further, assume that, either because shareholders
have difficulty distinguishing good postponements from bad ones, or because
there are so many shareholders with diverse views, in the absence of a rule
prohibiting postponements some shareholder brings suit whenever the board
postpones an imminent vote. B represents the net benefits of a postponement
that is in the interests of shareholders, which may include the preservation of a
deal that is in shareholders' best interests and would otherwise be lost (as was
asserted to have been the case in Inter-Tel) or alternatively, even if the
transaction would not be irretrievably lost, cost savings associated with not
218. See supra Subsection III.A.3.
219. In addition, some of these variables may not be independent of others. For example, the
board may be more likely to postpone a meeting in bad faith if it perceives a lower
probability of court detection. For simplicity, however, I assume all variables to be
exogenously determined.
220. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2001) (authorizing the indemnification of directors
provided that they acted in good faith); United Vanguard Fund, Inc. v. TakeCare, Inc., 693
A.2d 1076, 1079 (Del. 1997) (discussing the potential for reimbursement of a shareholder's
attorneys' fees under the common corporate benefit doctrine).
221. The Delaware Chancery Court's widely acknowledged efficiency and speed may reduce
these costs to some extent. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State




having to resolicit proxies."' Finally, CD is the cost of drafting a charter
amendment prohibiting the board from postponing an imminent vote.
The net benefits from such a charter provision are a function of the costs
that it reduces and the benefits that it foregoes. The benefit that it foregoes is
the ability of the board to postpone when it is in shareholders' interests to do
so, discounted by the probability of the court erroneously enjoining the
postponement. In expected value terms, this is expressed in equation (1) as
follows:
(1) Benefits Foregone = P(P) * [((1 - P(B)) * B) * - P(ED))].
The costs that a prohibition on postponements reduces are litigation costs,
which will not be incurred in the absence of a postponement, and the costs
associated with a postponement against shareholders' interests that the court
would fail to detect, less the costs of drafting the charter amendment. These
costs can be further broken down as follows: let X represent the litigation costs
of successfully challenging bad postponements. Thus, X = P(D) * (P(B) * L).
Let Y represent the litigation and corporate costs of bad postponements
unsuccessfully challenged. Y is thus a function of the probability that a court
fails to detect a postponement that is against shareholders' interests and of the
probabilities, and associated costs, of good faith but inefficient postponements
and postponements that are motivated by the board's self-interest. Y can be
expressed as follows: Y = (1 - P(D)) * [P(M) * (L + C(M)) + P(I) * (L +
C(I))]. Finally, let Z represent the litigation costs of challenging
postponements that are in the interests of shareholders. Because these
litigation costs are incurred regardless of whether the court erroneously
identifies the postponement as being against shareholders' interests, Z is
independent of P(ED), the probability of a false positive by the court. Thus Z =
(1 - P(B)) * L. The costs that a charter provision reduces are expressed in
equation (2):
(2) Costs Reduced = P(P) * [X + Y + Z] - CD.
Shareholders should prefer the charter amendment provided that the costs
it reduces exceed the benefits it foregoes; that is, provided that (2) > (1). If this
inequality is satisfied, then the residual agency costs that are reduced by a
prohibition on postponements exceed the monitoring costs that such a
prohibition entails. As should be intuitive, a lower probability of court
detection of bad postponements (P(D)), a higher probability of bad
222. See supra notes 203-205 and accompanying text.
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postponements (P(B)), and higher litigation costs (L) all increase the
attractiveness of a prohibition against postponements of imminent votes, while
a higher probability of good postponements (1 - P(B)) and a lower probability
of erroneous judicial invalidation of good postponements (P(ED)) reduce the
appeal of such a prohibition. A very low overall probability of postponement
(P(P)) also makes it less likely that shareholders would choose to prohibit
postponements, since it will generally be inefficient to incur drafting costs to
account for a remote contingency.
There is good reason to think that for many companies the costs reduced
by a prohibition on postponements of imminent votes on transactions exceed
the benefits foregone as a result of such a prohibition. The potential
contingencies justifying an imminent postponement are likely to be few given
that the board is free to postpone the meeting before the eleventh hour if it
believes that shareholders would otherwise be acting without the benefit of all
material information;223 thus both the probability of a good postponement
(1 - P(B)) and the benefits from such a postponement (B) may be relatively
low. At the same time, the potential for abuse and the ramifications of board
error, represented in the model by the variables P(M), P(I), C(M), and C(1),
may be significant, particularly in the context of a possible end-game situation
such as a proposed merger. Indeed, it is presumably because of the magnitude
of these two expected costs-board error and board self-interest- in the
corporate control context that boards are not relieved of their Revlon duties,
even when directors are ostensibly independent and stand to lose their jobs if
the deal is approved.2" Similarly, the best explanation as to why Delaware law
requires that shareholders vote to approve mergers is that there is a material
risk that the board may enter into a suboptimal deal, whether in good faith or
out of self-interest." Because a postponement increases the voting power of
proponents of the transaction, including arbitrageurs, it magnifies the risk that
such a merger will be consummated and thereby exacerbates the principal-
agent problem.
In a sense, the pivotal variable in the model is P(D), the probability that a
court will correctly identify bad postponements. If the court is perfect at
distinguishing postponements that are in shareholders' interests from those
that are not, so that P(D) = 1, and assuming that the probability of false
223. See Stone, supra note 202, at 938-40 (distinguishing between a board's coordinating powers
and its operating powers and arguing that fixed rules are more effective with respect to the
latter because the contingencies are fewer and the potential for manipulation is greater).
224. See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.




positives by the court (P(ED)) is zero, then equations (1) and (2), which
represent the foregone benefits and reduced costs associated with a prohibition
on last-minute postponements, can be rewritten as follows:
(1*)Benefits Foregone = P(P) * [(1 - P(B)) * B]
(2*)Costs Reduced = P(P) * [P(B)*L + (1 - P(B)) * L] - CD = P(P) *
L- CD
Assuming further that it is certain that the board will attempt to postpone a
vote, so that P(P) = 1, shareholders will rationally decide not to adopt a rule
prohibiting postponements of imminent votes provided that (1 - P(B)) * B > L
- CD. This inequality indicates that if courts' policing capabilities are perfect
then the only costs that a prohibition on postponements reduces are litigation
costs (net of the costs of drafting the charter provision), and thus shareholders
will opt to give the board the postponement power whenever there is any
substantial probability that a postponement might allow the board to
disseminate important information to shareholders concerning the merits of a
transaction that shareholders would otherwise vote down.
Implicit in Vice Chancellor Strine's opinion in Inter-Tel is his belief that the
probability that courts will detect postponements that are not in shareholders'
interests (P(D)) is indeed fairly high. He suggests, for example, that "the
powers of equity can police manipulative behavior " =6 and that when a
postponement is "tainted by ... self-interest ... principles of entire fairness
could have bite." 2 7 But in fact, there are reasons to think that the probability
that a court will detect bad postponements may be low,"' particularly given
the ease with which directors can argue that shareholders need additional
disclosure in order to make a fully informed decision. 9 In particular, one
would expect courts to have difficulty distinguishing beneficial postponements
from well-intentioned postponements that are in fact against shareholders
interests, since this determination requires an inquiry into the merits of the
transaction and arguably involves the kind of business judgment that lies
226. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 818 (Del. Ch. 2007).
227. Id. at 812 n.78.
228. Cf. Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role:
"Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers, 8o TEx. L. REV. 261, 298 (2001) (arguing that in the
context of entrenchment, judges will be unable to obtain the information needed to
distinguish good entrenchment from bad entrenchment).
229. Cf Klein, supra note 27, at 168 (cautioning that if courts accept a board's assertion that
shareholders lack sufficient information concerning the subject of the vote as a justification
for interfering with the shareholder franchise then "the flood gates will open to
management manipulation of the election machinery").
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beyond the scope of courts' expertise. Although courts might be relatively well
equipped to detect bad faith postponements where the board has a patent
interest in the transaction, certain more subtle conflicts, such as the possibility
that otherwise disinterested directors may be influenced by senior managers
who expect to have a position in the post-merger entity, may be harder for
courts to identify. It is therefore questionable whether principles of equity or
entire fairness review can bear the weight that the Vice Chancellor assumes
they can.
At the very least, Inter-Tel shareholders apparently were not entirely
satisfied with courts' policing capabilities. In voting against giving the board
the power to adjourn the special meeting if the Mitel merger faced defeat, they
implicitly performed the calculus presented above and concluded that the
probability that a court would be able to detect a postponement that was not in
shareholders' interests was not high enough to justify giving the board the
adjournment power. The court thus substituted its ex post judgment of the
relative costs and benefits of permitting a postponement for shareholders' ex
ante judgment. It is possible that the court was correct from an ex post
perspective. That is, Inter-Tel may very well have been a case in which there
were net benefits from the postponement, which allowed the board to disclose
its private information concerning the company's recent earnings decline and
arguably prevented shareholders from losing a deal that was in their best
interests. But such a case-by-case judicial approach entails error costs, and
shareholders might, as in the case of Inter-Tel, find a fixed rule preferable to
those costs.
To be sure, the Inter-Tel shareholders that voted against empowering the
board to adjourn the special meeting if the merger faced defeat were not the
same as the shareholders who voted to approve the merger at the rescheduled
meeting. But this does not undermine the legitimacy or relevance of the initial
vote to deny the board the adjournment power for two reasons. First,
shareholders are constantly bound by voting decisions made by their
predecessors. Indeed, any charter amendment binds shareholders who
purchase shares in the corporation at a later date; the law presumes that
subsequent shareholders purchase their shares with notice of preexisting
charter and bylaw provisions. It seems reasonable to assume that Inter-Tel
shareholders who purchased shares after the original record date (many of
them sophisticated hedge funds and arbitrageurs)23° were also on notice of the
vote to deny the board the adjournment power. Second, Vice Chancellor Strine
specifically found as a matter of fact that the ultimate approval of the merger




was attributable to shareholders who held shares on both record dates
changing their minds about the merits of the merger, rather than to the
different composition of Inter-Tel's shareholder base at the rescheduled
meeting.231 Given that the Vice Chancellor took pains to emphasize this point,
it would seem odd to suggest that the vote to deny the board the adjournment
power did not truly reflect the will of the relevant Inter-Tel shareholders.
Of course, the Inter-Tel board might have argued that when the
shareholders voted against allowing the board to adjourn the meeting in order
to preserve the merger they were inadequately informed about the benefits of
the merger and thus the vote was fundamentally flawed. But this argument is
misplaced. As the foregoing analysis has suggested, one of the principal
benefits that shareholders give up when they prohibit the board from
postponing an imminent vote is the possibility that the board has better
information than do shareholders about the benefits of a transaction. As this
Section has argued, shareholders might decide to deny the board the power to
postpone an imminent vote with full knowledge of the possibility that the
board might have a better sense than shareholders about the merits of the
transaction. Thus, the mere fact that shareholders might have been
inadequately informed about the benefits of the underlying merger does not
prove that they were inadequately informed about the ex ante benefits and
costs of allowing the board to postpone the vote. Moreover, this argument is
particularly unconvincing given that the board was responsible for apprising
shareholders of the potential benefits from endowing the board with the
adjournment power. Ultimately, the decision in Inter-Tel is difficult to square
with the shareholders' ex ante determination to deny the board the
adjournment power.
C. Choosing a Default Rule
This Part has argued that shareholders might rationally decide ex ante to
prohibit the board from postponing an imminent vote on a transaction. The
question remains what the default rule should be in the absence of such an
explicit prohibition. This Section argues that the traditional Blasius compelling
justification standard, in its pure form rather than in its diluted post-Inter-Tel
form, represents an optimal "penalty" default rule. The benefit of this rule is
that it will induce the board to reveal up front to shareholders the possibility
that it might postpone an imminent vote, and thereby enable shareholders to
decide whether to grant the board the power to do so.
231. Id. at 817.
2087
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
This Section then briefly discusses how the "imminence" of a vote on a
transaction at the time of a postponement should be defined for the purposes
of determining whether the postponement triggers Blasius review. It argues
that imminence should be understood as a proxy for the requirement that the
board's action have a sufficient disenfranchising effect to trigger Blasius. Thus,
a vote should be considered imminent if in the absence of a postponement
shareholders would have voted against the transaction. So understood,
imminence bears on the agency cost considerations presented in Section III.B.
and should be a prerequisite to triggering Blasius review under the default rule.
When it is ambiguous as to whether such a disenfranchising effect exists,
however, Blasius should still be deemed to apply in order to reinforce the
information forcing benefits of the penalty default rule and to prevent boards
from using private information to circumvent that rule.
1. The Justification for a Penalty Default
Default rules exist to fill gaps in incomplete contracts. Professors Ayres and
Gertner identify two distinct sources of contractual incompleteness with
different implications for the optimal default rule. First, the transaction costs of
contracting to account for a particular contingency might exceed the benefits of
doing so.232 If this is the case, then an optimal default rule might aim to
replicate what the parties would have bargained for ex ante had transaction
costs not been prohibitive. 3' Contractual incompleteness might also result
from one party strategically withholding information from the other. 34 In this
case, an efficient default rule should be set against the more informed party to
give him an incentive to contract around the default rule and reveal
information to the less informed party. 3' Alternatively, contractual
incompleteness might result from both parties withholding information from
the court in order to shift the costs of contract formation to the court, in which
case the default rule should again be set in such a way as to encourage the
parties to contract around it.236
232. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 20, at 92.
233. Id. at 93. A "would have wanted" default may still be inefficient if it is more costly for courts
to determine what the parties would have wanted than for the parties to contract explicitly.
Id.
23. Id. at 94.
235. Id. at 97.
236. Ayres and Gertner argue that in this case a nonenforcement default is preferable because,
although a penalty default set against one party to the contract will encourage that party to




It is unlikely that the transaction costs attendant to amending a corporate
charter to either explicitly allow or prohibit board postponements of imminent
votes would be prohibitively high. Certainly amending a charter entails some
drafting costs as well as costs associated with holding a shareholder vote, such
as the filing and distribution of proxy materials.237 Another contracting cost
reflects the possibility that shareholders might make the wrong decision with
respect to whether to prohibit such postponements if they lack adequate
information concerning the variables relevant to the agency cost analysis
presented above when voting on the charter amendment. However, extensive
proxy disclosure should reduce this risk, and, assuming the board wants the
flexibility to postpone an imminent vote, it has an incentive to inform
shareholders of the arguments against such a charter amendment. Moreover,
these costs are unlikely to exceed the costs that a court faces in trying to
determine what the parties would have wanted. Although this Part has argued
that shareholders might under certain conditions prefer to prohibit last-minute
postponements, they might also choose to permit them if shareholders have
sufficient faith in their board or in the court's detection capabilities such that
the probability of a postponement that is against shareholders' interests (P(B))
and the associated costs of such a postponement (C(M) and C(I)) are low,
while the probability that the court will successfully detect and enjoin such
postponements (P(D)) is high. Because the outcome of the agency cost analysis
will depend on variables that differ across firms and that cannot be measured,
even in relation to one another, without undertaking a fact-intensive inquiry
into the quality of the particular board, courts are likely to find it difficult to
determine what form a "would have wanted" default should take in any
particular case.
But a strong argument can be made in favor of a penalty default rule that
prohibits postponements of imminent votes on transactions. First, a clear
default rule one way or the other finds support if you assume that the ex post
costs to the court of determining whether a postponement is in the interests of
shareholders likely exceed the ex ante contracting costs to the corporation.
More specifically, the board presumably has better information than
shareholders with respect to the possibility that it might postpone a vote in
order to preserve a transaction. For one thing, the board can be expected to
have private information regarding whether it is considering pursuing a
business combination that will require shareholder approval. And, consistent
case of a pseudo-agency relationship between a board and shareholders, however, it is not
clear what form a "windfall" would take. Thus, a penalty default set against the more
informed party should work just as well as a nonenforcement penalty.
237. See supra text accompanying note 195.
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with Vice Chancellor Strine's reasoning that boards cannot be expected to
remain neutral with respect to transactions that they have authorized and
submitted to a shareholder vote,235 boards will likely seek to reserve for
themselves the ability to postpone a vote in order to preserve a transaction that
shareholders are about to vote against. A penalty default rule encourages the
board, inasmuch as it desires the flexibility that the postponement power
provides, to reveal this possibility to shareholders, who can then perform the
cost-benefit analysis presented above for themselves.
Such a default rule might take several forms. First, it could take the form of
a per se rule against postponements of imminent votes. Such a per se rule
might, however, run into problems in extreme cases if it prevents the board
from discharging its duty under the federal securities laws and the state law
duty of candor not to make materially misleading statements. For example, one
can imagine a situation in which a target board signs a merger agreement with
a force the vote provision that prevents the board from terminating the
agreement even if it decides that the deal is no longer in the interests of
shareholders. 3 9 If, on the night before the meeting, the corporation discovers a
new product that will triple the value of the company, the board may have a
duty to update its prior recommendation of the deal 4 ° But it will not have
time to do so unless it can postpone the meeting. This example, though
stylized, arguably favors a default rule comparable to Blasius's existing
compelling justification standard over a per se prohibition. But that standard
should be given the teeth that it had prior to Inter-Tel and should only be
deemed satisfied when it is entirely clear that, had shareholders foreseen the
particular circumstances at hand or the contingency that ultimately arose, they
would have opted to permit the board to postpone the vote. In particular, a
showing that shareholders would benefit from additional disclosure should be
insufficient to establish a compelling justification; the onus should be on the
board to disseminate relevant information prior to the eleventh hour. If
shareholders choose to waive a Blasius claim with respect to votes on a
transaction then they should be permitted to amend the company's charter to
238. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
239. The DGCL authorizes the use of force the vote provisions. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 146
(Supp. 2008).
240. Cf In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the duty





explicitly permit the board to postpone imminent votes 14 ' This result was
forced on the shareholders of Inter-Tel.
2. The Role of the Imminence Requirement
The agency cost analysis presented in Section III.B. of this Note focused on
a scenario in which a board postpones an imminent vote on a transaction. This
Subsection will briefly comment on the role that the imminence requirement
plays in that agency cost analysis, and on the meaning that imminence should
be given in applying the default rule proposed in the previous Subsection to
determine whether a particular postponement of a vote on a transaction
triggers Blasius review.
The requirement that a vote be imminent at the time of the postponement
in order to trigger Blasius review should be understood as merely a proxy for
the general requirement, discussed in Part I, that the challenged action have a
sufficiently disenfranchising effect. In the context of postponements, the idea is
that the closer the postponement is to the date of the vote, the more likely it is
that the postponement has the actual effect of preventing shareholders from
voting down the transaction. When the postponement occurs far enough in
advance of the date of the meeting, it may not be clear whether shareholders
would have ultimately voted against the transaction in the absence of a
postponement. Because Blasius is such a powerful doctrine, the Delaware
courts have not applied it to board action that does not have the practical effect
241. Some commentators have suggested that companies should not be permitted to opt out of
corporate law rules even via charter amendments approved by shareholders. This argument
is premised on the assumption that any given shareholder is "unlikely to be pivotal" to the
outcome of the vote and thus may rationally decide not to make the investment necessary to
become fully informed as to the subject matter of the vote, and consequently may support
even value-decreasing charter amendments proposed by management. See Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter
Amendments, 102 HArv. L. REv. 1820, 1836-37 (1989). However, others have criticized the
conclusion that rational shareholder apathy will lead them to blindly support managers'
proposals. See Roberta Romano, Comment, Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous
Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1599, 1607-11 (1989) (arguing that
voting in favor of management's proposals is not the optimal strategy for uninformed
shareholders, who would fare better by adopting a mixed voting strategy in which they only
follow management some proportion of the time and thereby "tilt the election toward the
informed" shareholders). Moreover, given the rise of shareholder activism and of proxy
advisory services that make voting recommendations to shareholders, shareholders are
unlikely to exhibit excessive deference to proposals by the board to waive Blasius claims as to
votes on transactions. The decision of Inter-Tel's shareholders to vote against giving the
board the adjournment power confirms this.
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of thwarting the outcome of a vote. "4 Thus, whether a vote is considered
imminent for Blasius purposes should not turn on anything so formulaic as the
precise amount of time between the postponement and the scheduled meeting
but rather on whether it appears that, in the absence of a postponement,
shareholders would have voted down the transaction that the board had
recommended.
Understood in this way, imminence is indeed relevant to the agency cost
analysis presented in Section III.B. When there is no reason to believe that
shareholders were going to vote against the transaction prior to the
postponement, both the potential costs (C(M) and C(1)) and benefits (B)
associated with the postponement are likely to be low. With respect to the
possible costs of a postponement, these depend in part on the assumption that
the increased voting presence of proponents of the transaction following the
postponement (and the corresponding change in the record date) will actually
affect the outcome of the vote. When the postponement has no such effect,
these potential costs are less worrisome. 43 On the other hand, the principal
potential benefit of a postponement is that it may enable the board to preserve
a beneficial transaction that shareholders would otherwise vote down on the
basis of incomplete information. But if the transaction is likely to be approved
even absent a postponement then this benefit is rather illusory. Therefore,
when the postponement occurs sufficiently in advance of the date of the
meeting and patently does not have the effect of thwarting the outcome of a
shareholder vote, it is essentially a nonevent for the purposes of the agency cost
calculus presented above. Given that there may be legitimate administrative
reasons for such a postponement- for example, it may simply be more
convenient to hold the meeting on a particular day-there is no reason to
straightjacket the board by prohibiting postponements that do not have a
disenfranchising effect and are thus plainly consistent with the use of the
adjournment tool which the DGCL implicitly contemplates.' Therefore, the
"imminence" of the shareholder vote at the time of the postponement (as that
term is defined above) should be a prerequisite to triggering Blasius review.
As acknowledged in the discussion of In re MONY, however, there is a
difficult line-drawing problem in determining how to treat a postponement
that may or may not have had the effect of thwarting the outcome of a
242. See supra notes 34-35 and 51-54 and accompanying text.
243. The potential costs of a postponement are also likely to be higher when the vote is imminent
because the closer the postponement is to the actual vote the more likely it is that the board
has already solicited proxies, and thus if the board decides to resolicit proxies the total proxy
solicitation costs will be higher.




shareholder vote.' s In re MONY itself is a good example. At the time of the
postponement, a majority of executed proxies favored the transaction but the
company had not yet secured a majority of the outstanding shares needed to
approve the merger. 46 On the other hand, the company still had a week to
solicit proxies. 7 Thus, it was uncertain whether the postponement actually
had a disenfranchising effect in terms of thwarting the outcome of the
shareholder vote that would have transpired in the absence of a postponement.
In close cases of this nature, the default rule should be that Blasius review
does indeed apply. The reason is related to the justification for a penalty default
rule presented in the previous Subsection. Insisting on ironclad proof that the
postponement did have a disenfranchising effect might allow a board to
strategically circumvent Blasius review by announcing the postponement at a
time when the board believes, but it is not objectively manifest, that
shareholders are going to vote against the transaction. This is a distinct
possibility given that boards might have private information concerning the
likely outcome of a vote to which courts may not be privy. For example, the
board may have received negative signs from a large shareholder regarding its
intended vote. Therefore, in order to reinforce the penalty default rule applying
Blasius to postponements of votes on transactions and thereby encourage
boards to seek explicit shareholder approval for such postponements ex ante,
the "imminence" requirement should be deemed satisfied as long as there is
both a substantial possibility that shareholders would have voted against the
transaction in the absence of the postponement and evidence that foreclosing
such an outcome was indeed the board's purpose. 4 Based on this standard, In
re MONY, like Inter-Tel, was arguably wrongly decided.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the Blasius doctrine encompasses two distinct
categories of board action. The first involves board action taken for the primary
purpose of preventing shareholders from determining the composition of the
board. The second involves board action taken for the primary purpose of
24s. See supra text accompanying note 159-16o.
246. In re MONY Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 669 (Del Ch. 2004).
247. Id. at 671.
248. This inquiry into the board's purpose is fundamentally different from Inter-Tel's good faith
analysis. See supra notes 125-126 and accompanying text. The only question should be the
narrow one of whether the board's immediate purpose is to prevent shareholders from
voting against the transaction; whether the board believes that thwarting a shareholder vote
is in the best interests of shareholders is irrelevant under the standard proposed herein.
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thwarting a vote on a transaction on which shareholders as a matter of
corporate law are entitled to vote. Although this second type of case is
considerably rarer than the first, it has traditionally been within the purview of
Blasius. The Delaware Chancery Court's recent decision in Inter-Tel threatens
to substantially limit the application of Blasius in such nonentrenchment cases.
This may be normatively undesirable depending on the assumptions one
makes with respect to agency costs and the court's policing capabilities. As
such, Blasius should continue to serve as a default rule that a corporation can
opt out of ex ante through a shareholder vote. Whether the Delaware Supreme
Court will endorse the limitations on the scope of Blasius that Inter-Tel imposes
remains to be seen.
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